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IS YOUR SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE
INVESTMENT FUND GREEN OR GREEDY?
HOW A STANDARD ESG DISCLOSURE
FRAMEWORK CAN INFORM INVESTORS
AND PREVENT GREENWASHING
Cara Beth Musciano
As environmental, social, and governance (ESG) investing
exponentially increases, so does the level of inconsistent ESG
disclosures, adding to investor confusion. Without any
mandates for standardization, companies will continue
disclosing their sustainability efforts without concrete facts
behind their subjective claims in hopes that they will appear
“greener”
to
investors.
This
practice—known
as
greenwashing—could become prevalent, resulting in capital
intended for sustainable investments flowing toward harmful
businesses investors sought to avoid. Regulators should develop
a mandatory ESG disclosure framework to create accurate,
reliable data and to prevent capital from being misallocated
against investors’ genuine sustainable efforts. Some existing
rules could hold those misstating their ESG efforts responsible,
but the potential for asset managers of ESG funds to greenwash
their financial disclosures needs to be addressed by mandating
a standard ESG disclosure framework.
An ESG fund disclosure framework, like those developing in
other countries, is necessary for asset managers when drafting
disclosures and labeling ESG products as part of an
overarching guide with similar frameworks for all market
participants pursuing sustainability. By creating consistent
ESG data among portfolio companies, asset managers, and
third-party raters, investors can properly inform themselves,
better evaluate greenwashing claims, and ultimately mitigate
greenwashing.



J.D. Candidate, 2023, University of Georgia School of Law; B.S., 2012, College of
Charleston. Thank you to Professors Bruner and Mangan for your helpful comments and to
my family for your love and support.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Investors are increasingly seeking to invest in a socially
responsible way by integrating environmental, social, and
governance (ESG)1 factors into their investing decisions.2
Investment firms are responding to this rapidly growing trend by
introducing socially responsible investment (SRI) products to match
the rising demand.3 The global value of firms leveraging ESG data
almost doubled between 2016 and 2020 from $22.9 trillion assets
under management (AUM)4 to over $40 trillion.5 ESG investing
spans asset classes and generally relies on various ESG factors
incorporated into investment processes.6 But these supposed
1 ESG investing is referred to as “sustainable investing,” “socially responsible investment”
(SRI), “impact investing,” and “ESG investing,” among other terms that cover a broad
spectrum of goals and strategies. See, e.g., SCHRODERS, UNDERSTANDING SUSTAINABLE
INVESTMENT AND ESG TERMS 4–5, https://www.schroders.com/en/sysglobalassets/globalassets/english/campaign/sustainability/interpret/understanding-sustainable-investmentand-esg-terms.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2022) (“The most commonly used terms include
‘sustainable’, ‘responsible’, ‘impact’ and ‘ESG investing.’”). This Note uses “ESG investing” for
consistency.
2 See SEC, THE DIVISION OF EXAMINATIONS’ REVIEW OF ESG INVESTING 1 (2021),
https://www.sec.gov/files/esg-risk-alert.pdf (“Investor demand for investment products and
financial services that incorporate [ESG] factors has increased in recent years.” (footnote
omitted)).
3 See id. (“In response to this demand, a range of investment advisers have offered several
ESG investment options, including registered investment companies and pooled investment
vehicles . . . .”); see also DOROTHY DONOHUE, INV. CO. INST., FUNDS’ USE OF ESG INTEGRATION
AND SUSTAINABLE INVESTING STRATEGIES: AN INTRODUCTION
1 (July 2020),
https://www.ici.org/doc-server/pdf%3A20_ppr_esg_integration.pdf (“Managers of registered
investment companies (funds) are responding to investor demand by creating funds intended
to align with investors’ values and, in some cases, achieve sustainability-related outcomes.”).
4 “Assets under management” are “the total market value of the investments that a person
or entity manages on behalf of clients,” though definitions and formulas vary. James Chen,
Assets
Under
Management
(AUM),
INVESTOPEDIA
(Oct.
6,
2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/aum.asp. For example, some AUM calculations
include bank deposits, mutual funds, and cash, while others limit it to funds under
discretionary management, such as with fund managers where the investor assigns authority
to the financial institution to trade on the investor’s behalf. Id.
5 See Anne-Laure Foubert, ESG Data Integration by Asset Managers: Targeting Alpha,
Fiduciary
Duty
&
Portfolio
Risk
Analysis,
OPIMAS
(June
17,
2020),
http://www.opimas.com/research/570/detail/ (noting the overall value of [AUM] ESG funds
“has increased significantly over the past four years” from $22.9 trillion to over $40 trillion).
6 See DONOHUE, supra note 3, at 2 (“Fund managers consider ESG factors to varying
degrees, and these approaches coexist on a broad investing spectrum. . . . [that] span[] asset
classes and active-to-passive strategies.”).
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socially responsible investments may not be as green as their
creators indicate.7
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)8
recently began rulemaking and soliciting comments on potential
ESG disclosure mandates,9 its past guidance from 2010 was not
interpreted by market players to require industry-wide ESG
disclosures, and no mandate exists in the United States yet.10 Since
the SEC’s past guidance, the United States Chamber of Commerce
reported that fifty-nine percent of the companies surveyed are now
voluntarily disclosing more ESG information.11 The Sustainability
See, e.g., Quinn Curtis, Jill Fisch & Adriana Z. Robertson, Do ESG Mutual Funds Deliver
on Their Promises?, 120 MICH. L. REV. 393, 408 (2021) (“Perhaps the most serious concern is
that ESG funds falsely portray themselves as adhering to an ESG investing (or voting)
strategy to attract investor money, a practice characterized as ‘greenwashing.’”); Rajna
Gibson Brandon, Simon Glossner, Philipp Krueger, Pedro Matos & Tom Steffen, Do
Responsible Investors Invest Responsibly? 3 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No.
712/2022, 2022), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525530 (“Some US institutional investors might
have responded to the recent popularity of ESG by signing the PRI opportunistically, but
failing to incorporate ESG considerations into portfolio management.”).
8 The SEC is an independent federal agency in charge of regulating financial securities. Its
mission is “to protect investors; maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate
capital formation.” About the SEC, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml (last visited Oct.
28, 2021).
9 See, e.g., Gary Gensler, Prepared Remarks Before the Principles for Responsible
Investment “Climate and Global Financial Markets” Webinar, SEC (July 28, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/gensler-pri-2021-07-28 (“Thus, I have asked SEC staff to
develop a mandatory climate risk disclosure rule proposal for the Commission’s consideration
by the end of the year.”); see also infra notes 139–148 and accompanying text.
10 See Brian Tomlinson, ESG and Fiduciary Duties: A Roadmap for the US Capital Market,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Nov.
1,
2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/01/esg-and-fiduciary-duties-a-roadmap-for-the-uscapital-market/ (“Existing SEC guidance, such as the 2010 interpretive guidance on climate
risks, has not been sufficient to create a perceived industry requirement to disclose against
material ESG factors.”). But see SEC, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ESG 9 (July 7, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/files/spotlight/amac/recommendations-esg.pdf (“Existing rules for
investment product disclosure and advertising are sufficient and adequate—but disclosures
would be improved by elements of comparability.”). For the SEC’s 2010 guidance regarding
climate disclosure, see SEC, COMMISSION GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO
CLIMATE CHANGE (Feb. 2, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf. Since
this Note’s initial writing, the SEC published a Proposed Rule on April 11, 2022, yet final
action is not expected until late 2022. See infra notes 144–145.
11 CCMC, 2021 SURVEY REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE & ESG REPORTING FROM THE PUBLIC
COMPANY
PERSPECTIVE
5
(2021)
[hereinafter
CCMC
SURVEY
REPORT],
https://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/08/CCMC_ESG_Report_v4.pdf.
7
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Accounting Standards Board (SASB) reported that in the United
States, eighty-eight percent of the 356 large-cap firms12 that filed
with the SEC in 2017 voluntarily disclosed some internal data
regarding their ESG initiatives and that fewer firms used
boilerplate disclosures in 2017 than in 2016.13 Further, nearly twothirds of companies are engaging with their investors about climate
risk, and almost half increased the detail in their climate reporting
due to investor input.14 Yet the lack of any ESG disclosure
standardization creates an information gap as more companies
disclose ESG risks using data each company individually
handpicks.15 This unregulated space is exhibiting increasingly
inconsistent data, leaving room for companies to mislead investors
by misstating their sustainability initiatives.16 The practice of
misrepresenting sustainability efforts—known as greenwashing—
is a growing concern for financial market participants who must
rely on companies’ subjective ESG disclosures to inform their

Large-cap firms are those with “more than $10 billion” in capitalization or financing from
investors. SASB, THE STATE OF DISCLOSURE 2017, at 25 (2017), https://www.sasb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/2017State-of-Disclosure-Report-web.pdf.
13 Id.
14 CCMC SURVEY REPORT, supra note 11, at 6.
15 See, e.g., Brendan Bailey & Edward Ivey, New Sustainability Standards Board to
Develop Global Sustainability Disclosure Standards, JD SUPRA (Dec. 10, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/sustainability-standards-board-to-2294194/
(“[T]his
sector of the market has lacked any sort of disclosure standardization since its initial
development.”); TCFD, TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES: 2021
STATUS
REPORT
73
(2021)
[hereinafter
TCFD
TASK
FORCE],
https://assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/60/2021/07/2021-TCFD-Status_Report.pdf
(“Fitch
[Ratings] recognize[] the emerging, latent nature of many climate-related risks, as well as
widespread gaps in disclosure.”).
16 See, e.g., HM TREASURY, GREENING FINANCE: A ROADMAP TO SUSTAINABLE INVESTING 21
(2021)
[hereinafter
GREENING
FINANCE],
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_da
ta/file/1026224/CCS0821102722006_Green_Finance_Paper_2021_v5_Bookmarked_48PP.pdf (discussing how the lack of a
common definition of sustainability activities “makes it difficult for companies and investors
to clearly understand the environmental impact of their decisions and can lead to consumer
harms like greenwashing”); Beau River, The Increasing Dangers of Corporate Greenwashing
in
the
Era
of
Sustainability,
FORBES
(Apr.
29,
2021,
7:16
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/beauriver/2021/04/29/the-increasing-dangers-of-corporategreenwashing-in-the-era-of-sustainability/?sh=6b938d944a32 (“The allure of greenwashing
sustainability initiatives often taps into what CEOs are best at: projecting confidence,
managing risk, and creating followership.”).
12
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investing decisions.17 This inconsistency is intensified by two
dynamics. First, asset managers themselves lack any standardized
ESG disclosure framework to reference when issuing their own
financial disclosures.18 Second, numerous third parties rate ESG
funds without standardized ESG terminology, leaving investors to
rely on multiple raters with vague and often conflicting ratings that
only add to the already vast ESG lexicon.19

17 See, e.g., Sara Bernow, Jonathan Godsall, Bryce Klempner & Charlotte Merten, More
Than Values: The Value-Based Sustainability Reporting That Investors Want, MCKINSEY &
CO.
(July
2019),
https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/sustainability/ourinsights/more-than-values-the-value-based-sustainability-reporting-that-investors-want#
(“Investors must therefore reconcile corporate sustainability disclosures as best they can
before trying to draw comparisons among companies.”); David Hoch & Robert Franz, EcoPorn Versus the Constitution: Commercial Speech and the Regulation of Environmental
Advertising, 58 ALA. L. REV. 441, 443 (1994) (“[I]nability to distinguish between
environmental pronouncements is also frustrating to the producers who do not know what
environmental claims they can legitimately make in regard to their products.”); River, supra
note 16 (“This shift in urgency is forcing companies and executives to reckon with their
sustainability journeys in new and more serious ways, and find the right way to articulate
their progress. One impact of the groundswell towards global sustainability is that the
consequences of corporate greenwashing are becoming more dire.”).
18 See Tim Quinson, ESG Study Shared with SEC Reveals Fund Labels Are Often Useless,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 11, 2022, 7:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-0111/esg-study-shared-with-sec-reveals-fund-labels-are-often-useless (quoting Andrew Behar,
CEO of shareholder advocacy group As You Sow, saying that “[i]nvestors need asset managers
to establish the philosophy underlying a fund and align the prospectus language and fund
name with the intent and the holdings” and “[t]he problem is that there is currently no truth
in labeling”). To view As You Sow’s ESG study shared with the SEC, see MIN YI LI, QIANCHEN
ZHENG, HAO-CHE HSU & YIN ZHU, AS YOU SOW, UCSD: IDENTIFY “GREENWASHING” FUNDS
USING NLP (Jan. 10, 2022), https://www.asyousow.org/reports/ucsd-identify-greenwashingfunds.
19 E.g., Curtis et al., supra note 7, at 420 (“[H]undreds of providers collect ESG data and
disseminate ESG ratings, and their ratings are only weakly correlated.”); Financial Factors
in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. 72,846, 72,847 (Oct. 30, 2020) (to be codified at
29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2550), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/11/13/202024515/financial-factors-in-selecting-plan-investments (“There is no consensus about what
constitutes a genuine ‘ESG’ investment, and ESG rating systems are often vague and
inconsistent, despite featuring prominently in marketing efforts.”); CCMC SURVEY REPORT,
supra note 11, at 5 (“[C]urrent use of third-party standard setters shows a wide divergence of
choices made by companies: For companies that rely on one or more standard-setting bodies,
44% use the [SASB], 31% use the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), 29% use the Task Force
on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure, and 24% use CDP.”). But cf. Curtis et al., supra note
7, at 448 n.205 (“Alternatively, the variety of ESG ratings and ratings providers may simply
reflect that the term ‘ESG’ covers a mix of strategies and considerations, and investors may
have different preferences with respect to those strategies.”).
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In April 2021, the SEC alerted asset managers about the risk of
investor confusion from rapidly growing demand for ESG investing,
the increasing number of ESG investment products and services,
and inconsistent ESG definitions.20 The effect is extreme in some
cases: A shareholder advocacy group adviser called one investment
firm “hypocritical” for promoting its SRI products while still
investing in fossil fuel companies accused of suppressing climate
research.21 As ESG investing and its inconsistent terminology
continue to grow, more asset managers are attracting retail
investors22 by touting their investments as sustainable while
lacking objective qualifications for their claims.23
Various efforts by both governmental and private entities have
sought to address greenwashing. The SEC initiated rulemaking for

20 See SEC, THE DIVISION OF EXAMINATIONS’ REVIEW OF ESG INVESTING, supra note 2, at
2 (“This rapid growth in demand, increasing number of ESG products and services, and lack
of standardized and precise ESG definitions present certain risks. For instance, the
variability and imprecision of industry ESG definitions and terms can create confusion among
investors if investment advisers and funds have not clearly and consistently articulated how
they define ESG and how they use ESG-related terms, especially when offering products or
services to retail investors.”).
21 See Chase Woodruff & David Sirota, Is Goldman Sachs’ New Fund Really Just
Greenwashing
Stocks?,
GUARDIAN
(Sept.
28,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/sep/28/is-goldman-sachs-new-fund-really-justgreenwashing-stocks (“[A] Capital & Main review of corporate documents shows that some of
Just [Capital]’s largest investments are in fossil fuel firms that have been sued for
suppressing global climate research . . . . ‘You shouldn’t be able to, with a straight face, invest
in the Dakota Access Pipeline with your left hand, and with your right hand tell people that
you’re doing responsible investing,’ Lisa Lindsley, capital markets adviser for the shareholder
advocacy group SumOfUs, told Capital & Main. ‘The compartmentalization is very
hypocritical.’”).
22 Retail investors are “small individual investors who commit capital for their personal
account rather than on behalf of another company.” Retail Investors, NASDAQ,
https://www.nasdaq.com/glossary/r/retail-investors (last visited Jan. 12, 2022).
23 See discussion supra note 17 and accompanying text; Curtis et al., supra note 7, at 409
(“[ESG] funds could be capitalizing on the demand for ESG products and charging high fees
while providing little incremental value to investors.”); Practical Guide to Corporate
Governance and Accounting: Implementing the Requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
¶ 1632, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) Risk (2020) [hereinafter Practical
Guide to Corporate Governance and Accounting ¶ 1632] (“The desire for a high ESG rating
can be strong enough to cause some entities to engage in ‘greenwashing,’ . . . . [and a] company
facing an investor revolt may be tempted to greenwash itself to obtain a higher-than-deserved
ESG rating.”).
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potential mandatory ESG disclosures.24 Larry Fink, CEO of
BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager with over $10 trillion
in AUM,25 announced that BlackRock will incorporate the European
Union’s Climate Transition Benchmark into its ESG investing
strategy.26 Some scholars are generating theories to reconcile the
lack of regulation with what companies must report under existing
mandates.27 Others discuss how various ESG asset managers, such
as pension fund trustees and ESG mutual fund managers, could be

24 See Gensler, supra note 9 (“I have asked SEC staff to develop a mandatory climate risk
disclosure rule proposal . . . .”); see also discussion infra notes 139–148 and accompanying
text.
25 See Robin Wigglesworth & Harriet Agnew, BlackRock Surges Past $10tn in Assets Under
Management, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/7603e676-779b-4c138f46-a964594e3c2f (“BlackRock’s assets under management have surged past the $10tn mark
for the first time, as the shift into cheap passive investment funds and buoyant markets
expanded the heft of the world’s largest money manager.”); Carlos Waters & Lindsey
Jacobson, How BlackRock Became the World’s Largest Asset Manager, CNBC (Oct. 13, 2021),
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2021/10/13/how-blackrock-amassed-over-9-trillion-in-managedassets.html (“[Blackrock’s portfolio] gives the money managers great levels of access and
influence. As the world adapts to the changing climate, BlackRock’s leadership is asking
major institutions to consider the risks of more extreme weather.”).
26 Tom Eckett, BlackRock to Add EU Climate Benchmark to $9bn ESG Enhanced ETF
Range, ETF STREAM (Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.etfstream.com/news/blackrock-to-add-euclimate-benchmark-to-9bn-esg-enhanced-etf-range/ (“Effective [December 1, 2021], the $9bn
six-strong ETF range will track MSCI climate indices that are aligned to the Paris
Agreement’s 1.5°C trajectory.”). For an overview on Europe’s sustainability efforts, see also
discussion infra Part IV. And for information on the European Union’s Climate Transition
Benchmark, see generally EU TECH. GRP. ON SUSTAINABLE FIN., CLIMATE BENCHMARKS AND
BENCHMARKS’
ESG
DISCLOSURES
(2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/business_economy_euro/events/documents/financ
e-events-190624-presentation-climate-benchmarks_en.pdf.
27 See, e.g., Kenya Rothstein, Comment, How Existing Securities Law Authorizes the SEC
to Mandate and Regulate Sustainability Reporting, SEC (May 2, 2021)
https://www.sec.gov/comments/climate-disclosure/cll12-8750003-237365.pdf (arguing for
SEC regulated mandatory ESG disclosures); Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure
Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923, 929 (2019) (proposing, as part of an issuer’s disclosures, a
mandatory Sustainability Discussion and Analysis (SD&A) that is modeled on existing
Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) and Compensation Discussion and Analysis
(CD&A) and reflects a similar principles-based approach to those provisions by requiring
issuers to address sustainability issues most important to their operations). But cf. Tyler
Corder, ESG Materiality Mandates Are Out of Scope for the SEC, TEX. PUB. POL’Y FOUND.
(May 26, 2021), https://www.texaspolicy.com/esg-materiality-mandates-are-out-of-scope-forthe-sec/ (discussing the SEC’s lack of authority to “pronounce subjective ESG information as
being material to investors” and arguing that “materiality must be determined by the
companies themselves and their external auditors”).
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liable for greenwashing under current laws and regulations.28
Regardless of how greenwashing is confronted, organizations
touting their sustainability need guidance from a standard ESG
framework to mitigate the widespread inconsistency.
This Note argues that the appropriate regulators29 should
develop a standard ESG disclosure framework so that ESG asset
managers can create market wide consistency for ESG funds’ labels
and prospectus disclosures. This would ultimately inform investors
of material ESG risks and deter greenwashing. Part II defines
greenwashing, discusses the history of greenwashing claims, and
notes readily available legal actions as potential remedial avenues.
Next, it discusses the rapid growth of ESG investing and the current
system of various ESG metrics. Part III describes the current laws
applicable to asset managers who offer ESG funds and ESG
disclosure regulations. Part IV then provides a brief comparative
analysis to consider foreign ESG disclosure mandates and
frameworks. Finally, Part V argues how asset managers can use a
standard ESG disclosure framework to better inform investors and
ultimately mitigate greenwashing.

28 See, e.g., Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and
Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV.
381, 385–86 (2020) (“ESG investing is permissible for a trustee of a pension, charity, or trust
subject to American trust fiduciary law if: (1) the trustee reasonably concludes that the ESG
investment program will benefit the beneficiary directly by improving risk- adjusted return;
and (2) the trustee’s exclusive motive for adopting the ESG investment program is to obtain
this direct benefit.”); Zachary Barker, Note, Socially Accountable Investing: Applying
Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management’s Fiduciary Standard to Socially Responsible
Investment Funds, 53 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 283, 287 (2020) (“[T]he Gartenberg test can
be employed to ensure that mutual fund directors are meeting their fiduciary duty under
§ 36(b) to protect SRI fund investors’ non-financial interests.”).
29 Whether the SEC has authority to require corporate climate disclosures is up for debate
among commentators, especially after the Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia v. EPA,
142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022), which held that Congress did not grant the Environmental Protection
Agency authority to devise caps to carbon dioxide emissions under the Clean Air Act. See,
e.g., Andrew Ramonas & Amanda Iacone, SEC Climate Rules Pushed Back Amid
Bureaucratic,
Legal
Woes,
BLOOMBERG
L.
(Oct.
19,
2022),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/sec-climate-rules-pushed-back-amidbureaucratic-legal-woes (“West Virginia v. EPA makes it very hard for the SEC to require any
corporate climate disclosures.”).
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II. INVESTMENT GREENWASHING
The environmental and financial sectors may not seem similar at
first,30 but their underlying, consumer-driven initiatives share a
focus on sustainability.31 For the environmental sector, efforts
supporting the environmental movement are commonplace, if not
pervasive. Green initiatives are now almost a requirement for major
market leaders: Google states that it has been carbon neutral since
2007 and aims to be carbon free by 2030;32 Amazon touts its
“Climate Pledge Friendly” drive to support its goal to reach “net zero
carbon by 2040;”33 Nike’s “Move to Zero” campaign promotes its
drive for “zero carbon and zero waste” to “help protect the future of
sport.”34 At first glance, these sustainability-driven initiatives may
seem like little more than the latest “marketing ploy,” but green
consumers have long been motivated to consume responsibly and
preserve the environment by factoring the planet into their

See Suzanne Kröner-Rosmalen, Lisanne Baks & Marjolein Ligthart, Environmental and
Financial Worlds Meet in the “E” of ESG, STIBBE (Oct. 12, 2021), http://www.stibbeblog.nl/allblog-posts/environment-and-planning/environmental-and-financial-worlds-meet-in-the-e-ofesg/#page=1 (“Developments in the environmental and financial worlds may appear to be at
first sight completely separate from each other. . . . In recent years, there has been an
increasing focus on sustainability, including in the financial sector.”).
31 See id. (“The financial sector can contribute to the realisation of national and
international sustainability objectives by, for example, financing sustainable initiatives or
providing insights into the sustainability objectives of financial products. Additionally,
(private) investors find sustainable investments increasingly important.”); see also Gensler,
supra note 9 (“[W]hat does the SEC have to do with climate? . . . Occasionally, investors in
our capital markets tell us that they . . . want something a little bit different. When it comes
to climate risk disclosures, investors are raising their hands and asking regulators for
more.”).
32
GOOGLE,
ENVIRONMENTAL
REPORT
2021
2–3
(Dec.
2021),
https://www.gstatic.com/gumdrop/sustainability/google-2021-environmental-report.pdf.
33
Packaging
Programs,
AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_v4_sib?ie=UTF8&nodeI
d=GMD974XRCEEJJDQJ (last visited Aug. 14, 2021). Amazon founder and CEO Jeff Bezos
claims, “Climate Pledge Friendly is a simple way for customers to discover more sustainable
products that help preserve the natural world,” and Amazon lists over 25,000 of these
products. Amazon Launches “Climate Pledge Friendly” to Make It Easier for Customers to
Discover and Shop for Sustainable Products, BUS. WIRE (Sept. 23, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20200923005297/en/Amazon-Launches%E2%80%98Climate-Pledge-Friendly%E2%80%99-to-Make-It-Easier-for-Customers-toDiscover-and-Shop-for-Sustainable-Products.
34 Sustainability, NIKE, https://www.nike.com/sustainability (last visited Oct. 14, 2022).
30
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purchasing decisions.35 Consumer concerns behind the modern
environmental movement began in the 1960s.36 This movement set
the stage for advertisers and marketers to target eco-conscious
consumers, leading to increased regulation37 and major legislation,
such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act.38
Today, the sustainability movement has reached nearly every
type of green consumer, including those in the financial sector.39 For
example, by June 2021, over 4,000 asset managers around the globe
had committed to actively incorporating ESG factors into their
investment processes by becoming signatories of the Principles for
Responsible Investment (PRI).40 Yet, despite the boom of ESG
35 See Eric L. Lane, Consumer Protection in the Eco-Mark Era: A Preliminary Survey and
Assessment of Anti-Greenwashing Activity and Eco-Mark Enforcement, 9 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 742, 745 (2010) (“The green . . . consumer is motivated by a desire to
consume responsibly, preserve the environment and factor the well being of our planet into
her purchasing decisions. Green branding, therefore, is more than just the latest marketing
ploy to get people to buy products.” (footnote omitted)).
36 See Eric L. Lane, Greenwashing 2.0, 38 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 279, 280 (2013) [hereinafter
Lane, Greenwashing] (“From the birth of the environmental movement in the 1960s, and
through its growth over the last several decades, environmental marketing has never been
far behind.”).
37 See David Gibson, Note, Awash in Green: A Critical Perspective on Environmental
Advertising, 22 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 423, 428 (2009) (“During the early 1980s . . . environmental
marketing experienced a surge in popularity and the complexity of environmental marketing
issues proved too complex for the existing rules to adequately address.”).
38 See Lane, Greenwashing, supra note 36, at 284 (“Two major legislative achievements of
this time were the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act. . . . Both continue to be viewed as
landmark pieces of environmental legislation.” (footnotes omitted)).
39 See SCHRODERS, supra note 1, at 3 (“Over the last decade, sustainability has become an
increasingly crucial aspect of investing. . . . Retail investors have . . . shown an appetite for
products that recognize and reflect the relationship between their investments and an ever
more challenging social and environmental backdrop.”).
40 See Lorenzo Saa, PRI Reaches 4,000 Signatories with Emerging Markets Boosting RI
Uptake, PRI (June 14, 2021), https://www.unpri.org/pri-blog/pri-reaches-4000-signatorieswith-emerging-markets-boosting-ri-uptake/7823.article
(announcing
PRI’s
4,000th
signatory). These asset managers became signatories by signing PRI’s statement of six
principles on ESG investing: “Therefore, where consistent with our fiduciary responsibilities,
we commit to the following: Principle 1: We will incorporate ESG issues into investment
analysis and decision-making processes. Principle 2: We will be active owners and incorporate
ESG issues into our ownership policies and practices. Principle 3: We will seek appropriate
disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest. Principle 4: We will promote
acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment industry. Principle
5: We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles.
Principle 6: We will each report on our activities and progress towards implementing the
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investing in the financial sector,41 regulation has failed to keep up
with the public’s growing climate concerns, leaving much of the
market unchecked and vulnerable to increasing greenwashing
claims.42
A. WHAT IS GREENWASHING?

1. Defining Greenwashing. The increased push for ESG investing
has created a relatively new challenge for financial firms and
investors43: how to address investments marketed as sustainable
yet lacking factual support for their sustainability claims, or the
practice of greenwashing.44 No universal greenwashing definition
exists,45 but an often-used definition is “the act of misleading
consumers regarding the environmental practices of a company or
the environmental benefits of a product or service.”46 This attributes
Principles.”
What
Are
the
Principles
for
Responsible
Investment?,
PRI,
https://www.unpri.org/pri/what-are-the-principles-for-responsible-investment (last visited
Aug. 14, 2022).
41 See infra Sections II.B–C.
42 See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser & Anne Tucker, Buyer Beware: Variation and Opacity
in ESG and ESG Index Funds, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1921, 1999 (2020) (“In ESG investing’s
low-regulation environment, these market forces are largely unchecked.”); Gensler, supra
note 9 (“More than 550 unique comment letters were submitted in response to my fellow
Commissioner Allison Herren Lee’s statement on climate disclosures in March. Three out of
every four of these responses support mandatory climate disclosure rules.”); infra note 50.
For a global view, see Theo Andrew, European Regulators Must Align on ESG or Risk
Greenwashing Deluge, ETF STREAM (Nov. 2, 2021) [hereinafter Andrew, European
Regulators], https://www.etfstream.com/features/european-regulators-must-align-on-esg-orrisk-greenwashing-deluge/ (“Across the globe, financial regulators are rushing to catch up
with the boom in ESG investing . . . .”).
43 See infra Sections II.B–C; supra notes 16–17.
44 See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, Of Zombie Permits and Greenwash Renewal Strategies: Ten
Years of New York’s So-Called “Environmental Benefit Permitting Strategy,” 22 PACE ENV’T
L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (“‘Greenwash’ is a term used to describe the application of an
environmentally friendly sounding name to an environmentally unfriendly practice.”).
45 See Noemi Nemes et al., An Integrated Framework to Assess Greenwashing 4 (Climate
Soc. Sci. Network, Working Paper No. 2021:1, 2021), https://www.cssn.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/CSSN-Working-Paper-2021-on-Assessing-Greenwashing-1.pdf
(noting the diverse perspectives of the conversation that make it unsurprising that no single
definition is accepted universally).
46 Id. For a commonly cited greenwashing study, see TERRACHOICE, THE SEVEN SINS OF
GREENWASHING: HOME AND FAMILY EDITION 10 (2010), https://www.twosides.info/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/Terrachoice_The_Sins_of_Greenwashing__Home_and_Family_Edition_2010.pdf (listing seven sins of greenwashing from its 2007
study).
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an intent to deceive to those making the greenwashing claims in a
calculated way to become more attractive to the growing demands
of eco-conscious consumers.47
Greenwashing has been conceptualized across many different
industries and fields of research and is a part of widespread
regulatory and governmental discussions, with both lending to its
lack of a uniform definition.48 In addition, the overall increase in
consumer demand for socially responsible initiatives has led to a
continually emerging swath of empirical reports on greenwashing.49
This cross-industry awareness has also led to consumers becoming
“increasingly savvy at detecting and suing for ‘greenwashing.’”50
Reports point to a growing number of greenwashing lawsuits, but
suing for greenwashing is not a new development when considered
outside of the ESG investing context.51 A look at the history of
greenwashing claims is informative as to the various approaches
used in recent ESG investing claims.
2. History of Greenwashing Claims. Relevant caselaw on the
greenwashing of ESG funds is thin. A background on general
greenwashing claims helps frame the evaluation amidst increasing
litigation against companies.52 Two main types of greenwashing
47
See, e.g., Will Kenton, Greenwashing, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 22, 2022),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/greenwashing.asp (“Greenwashing is considered an
unsubstantiated claim to deceive consumers into believing that a company's products are
environmentally friendly.”).
48 See Nemes et al., supra note 45, at 4 (“[G]reenwashing has been examined from a number
of academic disciplines in addition to being a part of conversations among various government
bodies and non-governmental organizations alike. Research contributing to its
conceptualization and understanding has come from the fields of business (including
advertising, ethics, and marketing), media and communications, environmental studies and
management, production engineering, law, and the social sciences (including economics,
geography, political science, psychology, and sociology) among others.”).
49 See id. at 5 (“New empirical analyses of greenwashing are constantly emerging in the
wake of seemingly expanding consumer demands for corporate accountability and social
responsibility alongside concerns about climate change and the environment.”); see also infra
notes 121–126 and accompanying text.
50 Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP, Greenwashing Claims on the Rise: Avoiding
Dirty Laundry, JD SUPRA (Apr. 19, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/greenwashingclaims-on-the-rise-1926530/.
51 See id. (“Given the rise in green marketing, the capital flowing into ‘green’ funds, and
the increasing focus on detecting greenwashing, we are likely to see more enforcement efforts
and civil suits.”).
52 See, e.g., David Baay, Garrett Gibson & Jay Patel, Greenwashing: A Survey of Recent
Litigation, JD SUPRA (Dec. 10, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/greenwashing-a-
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claims have been made: (1) consumer protection claims and (2)
securities fraud claims.53
First, deceptive environmental statements have been the root of
certain consumer protection suits based on false advertising or
marketing claims since the 1970s.54 In the late 1980s, consumers
pushed for regulation of environmental advertising, and states
began
enacting
advertising
regulations
and
enforcing
environmental marketing claims through existing consumer
protection laws.55 With ESG matters, however, state consumer
protection claims have been of “limited success,” and litigation costs
are “significant even when not appealed.”56 Recent claims include
SeaWorld failing to disclose facts about the health and safety of its
captive orcas (dismissed for lack of causation);57 a distributor failing
to disclose child labor and forced labor (dismissed for defect not
relating to the product’s central function);58 and a tea manufacturer
misleadingly labeling tea as “environmentally friendly” and
“sustainable” when it contained traces of glyphosate (dismissed for

survey-of-recent-3195116/ (“As climate change jurisprudence continues to evolve, an offshoot
of ‘greenwashing’ claims has generated a series of headline-grabbing lawsuits. . . . [M]ost
greenwashing claims are . . . claims of misrepresentation.”).
53 See Sarah Fedner, Ameena Majid & William Prickett, ESG Disclosures: Lessons Learned
and
Best
Practices
[Part
3
of
4],
JD
SUPRA
(Sept.
10,
2020),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/esg-disclosures-lessons-learned-and-94673/ (“Thus far,
litigation resulting from ESG disclosures generally arises in two contexts: (1) securities fraud
claims under federal law, or (2) consumer protection or consumer fraud claims under federal
or state laws.”).
54 See Lane, Greenwashing, supra note 36, at 304 (noting that out of all the historical
greenwashing cases, “environmental marketing claims about consumer products directed at
individuals . . . formed the basis of nearly all greenwashing cases in the 1970s, 80s, and 90s”).
55 See Gibson, supra note 37, at 429 (“As consumer demand for the regulation of
environmental advertising reached a fever pitch in the late 1980s, states began to enact
advertising regulations and enforce existing consumer protection laws to protect against an
onslaught of environmental marketing claims.”).
56 Connor Kuratek, Joseph A. Hall & Bett M. Huber, Legal Liability for ESG Disclosures,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Aug.
3,
2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/08/03/legal-liability-for-esg-disclosures/#10b.
57 See Hall v. SeaWorld Ent., Inc., 747 F. App’x 449, 452 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal
due to finding of no causal connection “when a complaining party would suffer the same harm
whether or not a defendant complied with the law” (quoting Daro v. Superior Ct., 61 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 716, 729 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007))).
58 See Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal in part
because plaintiff omitted the “crucial element” that “the defect must relate to the central
functionality of the product”).
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implausibility of consumer confusion).59 In class action cases, courts
have largely rejected ESG complaints when the plaintiff does not
“allege that they viewed and relied upon the challenged statements
before making purchase decisions.”60 Generally, consumer
protection greenwashing claims have been “slightly less successful
on motions to dismiss than securities fraud claims.”61
Second, in the securities context, most claims regarding
misleading disclosures have been made against companies (rather
than asset managers) under the anti-fraud provisions of the federal
securities laws, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
193462 and SEC Rule 10b–5,63 which apply broadly and create
liability for fraudulent statements made to investors.64 To be
actionable under Section 10(b), a statement must be (1) false or
misleading and (2) material to a reasonable investor.65 Courts have
found vague or aspirational language or forward-looking statements

See Organic Consumers Ass’n v. Bigelow Tea Co., No. 2017 CA 8375 B, 2018 D.C. Super.
LEXIS 11, at *12–13 (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 2018) (dismissing Count III of the complaint
after finding it implausible “consumers could be misled” and noting the plaintiff did not “not
give any facts regarding consumer belief or cite to any consumer survey that could render
th[e] claim[s] more than a nonactionable opinion”).
60 SOC’Y FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE & GIBSON DUNN, ESG LEGAL UPDATE 13 (June 2020),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Ising-Meltzer-McPhee-PercopoAssaf-Holmes-ESG-Legal-Update-What-Corporate-Governance-and-ESG-ProfessionalsNeed-to-Know-Society-for-Corporate-Governance-06-2020.pdf.
61 Fedner et al., supra note 53.
62 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (proscribing the use of any “manipulative or deceptive device” in
connection with a securities sale or swap agreement).
63 For the codified version of this rule, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2022).
64 See SOC’Y FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE & GIBSON DUNN, supra note 60, at 5 (noting the
“broad” application of Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b–5 and stating that “most” ESG
disclosure related securities litigation has arisen from Section 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange
Act); see, e.g., In re Equifax Sec. Litig., 357 F. Supp. 3d 1189, 1219, 1224 (N.D. Ga. 2019)
(denying a motion to dismiss because a jury could reasonably find defendants made material
misrepresentations related to cybersecurity); City of Brockton Ret. Sys. v. Avon Prods., Inc.,
No. 11-CIV-4665, 2014 WL 4832321, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014) (“[A] reasonable investor
would not rely on the statements discussed above as a guarantee that Avon would, in fact,
maintain a heightened standard of legal and ethical compliance.”).
65 See, e.g., In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 470 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Successfully
pleading an actionable material misrepresentation or omission requires a plaintiff to allege
facts demonstrating two things: (1) that a defendant made a statement or omission that was
false or misleading; and (2) that this statement or omission concerned a material fact.” (citing
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 38 (2011))).
59
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regarding ESG non-actionable.66 Cases in which the accuracy of
factual statements can be proven are more likely to proceed, but
they generally settle once past the dismissal stage.67 Examples
include class action allegations of false and misleading statements
and omissions to conceal an alleged tax bribery scheme in Brazil
(settled for $14.5 million),68 as well as allegations of a jeweler’s
misrepresentation of claims against it relating to the #MeToo
movement and false or misleading statements or omissions about
the jeweler’s in-house financing program (settled for $240 million).69
Additionally, under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933,
companies can be strictly liable for material misstatements and
omissions in their registration statements.70
For claims against asset managers, the SEC first held an active
ESG fund manager liable for mismanagement in 2008 where the
fund manager “failed to comply with its own internal SRI screening
and periodic review policies” by purchasing securities of companies
restricted by the fund.71 The proceedings were initiated under
Sections 203(e) and 203(k) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940

66 See In re Banco Bradesco S.A. Sec. Litig., 277 F. Supp. 3d 600, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2017)
(noting that aspirational language combined with qualifying language will generally
constitute “inactionable ‘puffery’”).
67 See SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, ESG 101: LANDSCAPE & CONSIDERATIONS 13 (Mar. 2022),
https://www.conference-board.org/pdf_free/SefarthESG101.pdf (“Cases that survive the
motion to dismiss phase are generally settled, sometimes for very large amounts.”); see also
Reenat Sinay, Brazilian Bank to Pay $14.5M to End Investor Suit Over Bribes, LAW360 (July
2, 2019, 1:53 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1174942/brazilian-bank-to-pay-14-5m-toend-investor-suit-over-bribes (describing the terms and reasons for the settlement); Jonathan
Stempel, Signet Jewelers in $240 Million Settlement Over Sexual Harassment, Loan Portfolio,
REUTERS (Mar. 26, 2020, 12:59 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-signet-results/signetjewelers-in-240-million-settlement-over-sexual-harassment-loan-portfolioidUSKBN21D2WB (same).
68 See Bradesco, 277 F. Supp. 3d at 610 (stating facts related to criminal corruption charges
and bribery schemes).
69 See In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 16-cv-6728, 2018 WL 6167889, at *2–5
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2018) (stating facts related to risky underwriting practices and sexual
harassment).
70 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (“In case any part of the registration statement . . . contained an
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, any person acquiring
such security . . . may . . . sue . . . .”).
71 Pax World Mgmt. Corp., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2761, Investment
Company Act Release No. 28344, 2008 WL 2917614, at *8–9 (July 30, 2008) (ordering the
fund manager is censured and responsible for a civil money penalty of $500,000).
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and Sections 9(b) and 9(f) of the Investment Company Act of 1940.72
Although enforcement of these regimes is under the SEC’s
jurisdiction, asset managers of passive ESG funds are subject to
different regulatory regimes based on different investment
strategies than those of active managers.73
For greenwashing claims, pointing to precise harms might be
difficult.74 Some commentators suggest that greenwashing, or the
mere prevalence of green marketing generally, creates skepticism
in the market and results in consumer cynicism; in turn, this
effectively precludes green marketing from having any actual clout
or influence on consumers.75 As ecologist Jay Westerveld originally
described in a 1986 essay, a classic case of greenwashing is hotel
signage suggesting that guests reuse their towels for the sake of the
environment.76 Presuming the hotel’s motivation behind the signs
was to save costs, its conservation claim is intentionally deceptive.77
Applying this concept to investors, Professor Miriam Cherry
explains how companies that greenwash their sustainability efforts
might harm retail investors by undercutting their intentions to
Id. at *1.
See, e.g., EVA SU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CAPITAL MARKETS: ASSET MANAGEMENT AND
RELATED POLICY ISSUES 3 (2019), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45957.pdf (noting that
“different types of asset management companies are subject to different regulatory
requirements,” including active versus passive strategies and private versus public firms).
74 See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, The Law and Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility
and Greenwashing, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 281, 300 (2014) (noting how greenwashing can
involve wrongdoing, distraction, deception, and hypocrisy, all of which are inherently
problematic ethically and legally, but might be difficult to pinpoint the exact harm in
individual cases).
75 See Jessica E. Fliegelman, The Next Generation of Greenwash: Diminishing Consumer
Confusion Through a National Eco-Labeling Program, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1001, 1007
(2010) (“One of the significant risks of greenwashing is that consumers will become skeptical
and cynical of environmentally-friendly products. Marketing experts agree that the ‘term
green is too widespread to have any real marketing clout,’ and ‘has become poisoned through
overuse.’”).
76 See Rui Guo, Wei Zhang, Tao Wang, Caroline Bingxin Li & Lan Tao, Timely or
Considered? Brand Trust Repair Strategies and Mechanism After Greenwashing in China—
From a Legitimacy Perspective, 72 INDUS. MKTG. MGMT. 127, 129 (2018) (“Since Jay
Westerveld first proposed the term ‘greenwashing’ in 1986, there have been many academic
definitions of the concept.”); Bruce Watson, The Troubling Evolution of Corporate
Greenwashing, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainablebusiness/2016/aug/20/greenwashing-environmentalism-lies-companies (noting the impetus
behind Jay Westerveld’s hotel towel example).
77 See Cherry, supra note 74, at 300 (“Assume that hotel management’s true motivation is
cost savings, and that the sign is therefore deceptive.”).
72
73
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invest while supporting the environment and that the biggest loss
is ultimately to the foundation of sustainability itself.78 Attention
and resources intended to be allocated toward sustainable efforts
through capital raised from investors of collective ESG funds are
instead diverted away from those efforts.79 This challenge is
fostered by the lack of consistent ESG reporting from investment
firms combined with the coinciding rapid increase in ESG investing
and the plethora of ESG terminology.80
B. ESG INVESTING

ESG investing is “a strategy that uses ESG analysis as a
significant part of the fund’s investment thesis to respond to
investors’ objectives, accomplish ESG-related outcomes, and pursue
investment returns.”81 SRI and ESG investing have roots in faithbased investing and in the civil rights, antiwar, and environmental
movements of the 1960s and 1970s.82 The first mutual funds
reflecting environmental concerns were formed in the 1970s, despite
there being more critics than ESG investments, as ESG criteria
upset conventional financial wisdom.83 But as society responded to
nuclear energy, sweatshops, apartheid, GMOs, climate change,
human trafficking, the gender wage gap, the LGBTQ movement,
78 See id. at 300, 302 (“Indeed, it is the collective harm that presents the most serious
challenge to the [corporate social responsibility (CSR)] endeavor. . . . Among those who lose
in these situations are the individual consumers and investors who care about CSR and find
themselves shocked to have mistakenly invested in non-CSR companies. The biggest loss,
however, is to the foundation of CSR itself.”).
79 See, e.g., Teh Shi Ning, Greenwashing Threat Grows with Rise of Sustainable Investing,
STRAITS
TIMES
(Oct.
24,
2021,
4:00
AM),
https://www.straitstimes.com/business/invest/greenwashing-threat-grows-with-rise-ofsustainable-investing (explaining how greenwashing could result in more resources and
attention being allocated away from global sustainability needs as more ESG products attract
money from asset owners wishing to make an impact).
80 See infra Sections II.B–C.
81 DONOHUE, supra note 3, at 2.
82 For a detailed history of SRI and ESG investing, see Blaine Townsend, From SRI to ESG:
The Origins of Socially Responsible and Sustainable Investing, 1 J. IMPACT & ESG INVESTING
1–2 (2020). Townsend differentiates SRI and ESG by noting that “[t]he modern SRI process
stands on three pillars: 1. Values-based avoidance screens[;] 2. Proactive sustainabilityfocused analytics—colloquially referred to as ‘ESG investing’[;] and 3. Corporate engagement
and impact investing.” Id. at 1.
83 See id. at 2 (“[T]raditional socially responsible investing had many more critics than
investment vehicles.”).
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and a host of other policy and cultural issues, SRI followed.84 By the
1980s, “the backbone” of United States SRI processes was a “classic
avoidance screen[],” or a portfolio avoiding alcohol, tobacco,
weapons, gambling, pornography, and nuclear energy investments
(i.e., “sin” companies).85 But when ESG investing was limited and
focused on the exclusion of sin companies, the cost of capital for
those excluded was not impacted because investors who were
focused solely on profit replaced withdrawn capital with their own
and were reaping high returns.86
In Europe, however, ESG analysis—as opposed to purely
exclusionary SRI investing—was demanded by investors concerned
about sustainability, climate change, and poor corporate
governance’s impact on the market and fiduciary duties.87 Back in
the United States, as ESG investing grew, early adopters similarly
began integrating key ESG factors into their investing processes.88
After the 2008–09 market crash and the Great Recession, asset
managers wanted a better way to assess the risks of climate change,
corporate governance, and corporate behavior.89 And by further
excluding sin companies, investors could raise excluded companies’
capital costs, inducing them to change their practices.90 Investors
sought to “combat the risks posed by poor governance practices that
threaten the stability of capital markets and the economy writ
large” and “counter the existential threats posed by social inequality
and climate change”91—bringing ESG analysis to its current
fundamental focus on evaluating long-term risk.

84 See id. at 3 (noting that innovation in the SRI market is often prompted by social
catalysts).
85 Id. at 5.
86 See KPMG, SUSTAINABLE INVESTING: FAST-FORWARDING ITS EVOLUTION 13 (Feb. 2020),
https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2020/02/sustainable-investing.pdf (“[I]t was
recognized that exclusion reduced the scope for diversification [but] dumping ‘sin’ stocks
yielded handsome profits to those who bought them without doing anything to pressure or
influence the ‘sinners.’”).
87 See Townsend, supra note 82, at 6 (describing ESG’s initial growth in Europe).
88 See KPMG, supra note 86, at 13 (“For early adopters, the journey started with the
exclusion of ‘sin’ stocks: shares in companies associated with activities deemed unethical.”).
89 See Townsend, supra note 82, at 10 (detailing the rise of ESG analysis when “[t]raditional
Wall Street analysis” did not provide the scope of risk assessment needed).
90 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 28, at 398 (emphasizing the role that collateral
benefits of ESG have on inducing substantive change in bad-ESG firms).
91 Reiser & Tucker, supra note 42, at 1925.
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Today, the continued significance of ESG investing is
exponentially driving more eco-conscious investors to put their
money where their mouths are—with $1.682 trillion in the United
States invested in “socially conscious” investments by June 2020.92
And reports say there is no stopping in sight93: Global ESG
investments are on track to exceed $50 trillion AUM by 2025, or
more than one-third of global AUM.94 Some suggest that the
COVID-19 pandemic will further drive ESG investing by awakening
the need for different investing approaches.95 Early ESG investing
adopters indicate that advancements in skill, data, and technology
will help further promote ESG investing.96 Additionally, over the
past decade, fund managers have significantly increased their
consideration of ESG factors in their investment practices for
multiple reasons, including differentiation, deeper client
relationships, and the growing demand of ESG investing.97
92 INV. CO. INST., NEW COMMON TERMINOLOGY FOR ESG INVESTING STRATEGIES 4 (Aug. 11,
2020),
https://www.ici.org/system/files/attachments/pdf/20_webinar_ici_esg_primer_0811_slides.pd
f.
93 See, e.g., Jon Hale, Sustainable Funds in the U.S. Saw Record Flows in the First Half of
2019, MORNINGSTAR (July 11, 2019) [hereinafter Hale, Sustainable Funds],
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/935713/sustainable-funds-in-the-us-saw-record%EF%AC%82ows-in-th (“Sustainable funds attracted an estimated $8.9 billion in net flows
in the first half of 2019, surpassing their $5.5 billion in flows for all of 2018. Flows into
sustainable funds have set calendar-year records for each of the past three years and appear
headed for a fourth.”).
94 See Press Release, ESG Assets Rising to $50 Trillion Will Reshape $140.5 Trillion of
Global AUM by 2025, Finds Bloomberg Intelligence, BLOOMBERG (July 21, 2021),
https://www.bloomberg.com/company/press/esg-assets-rising-to-50-trillion-will-reshape-1405-trillion-of-global-aum-by-2025-finds-bloomberg-intelligence/ (“(ESG) assets are on track to
exceed $50 trillion by 2025, representing more than a third of the projected $140.5 trillion in
total global [AUM] . . . .”).
95 See Why Covid-19 Could Prove to Be a Major Turning Point for ESG Investing, J.P.
MORGAN (July 1, 2020), https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/research/covid-19-esg-investing
(“As a result of the radical impact COVID-19 has had on global economies in such a short
space of time, many policymakers and investors are viewing the crisis as a wake-up call that
accelerates the need for a different approach to investing, as parallels have been drawn
between the unforeseen risks of a pandemic and issues such as climate change.”).
96 See Mark Kolakowski, The State of Sustainable Investing in 2021, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/the-state-of-sustainable-investing-in-2020-4787996
(last
updated May 23, 2022) (“[Early adopters of sustainable investing] also indicate that advances
in skills, data, and technology are helping to promote sustainable investing.”).
97 See, e.g., Nadia Cobalovic, David Mina & Mike Mullen, What Does the Rise of ESG Mean
for
Asset
Mangers’
Operations?,
N.
TR.
(July
21,
2021),
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ESG investing is progressively growing as it is “increasingly
viewed as good risk management.”98 One report found that ESG
investors might take on more small-cap risk, single-stock risk, and
interest-rate and inflation risk than investors in a standard allequity fund.99 ESG investors, however, base their decision to take
on that initial risk in the belief that considerations of stakeholders,
such as employees or customers, must be a part of the corporation’s
goals—and that the corporation can no longer focus solely on
maximizing returns.100 The hope is that, over time, their decision to
drop selecting where to invest based purely on profit will have a
growing impact on company value and cost of capital and will
provide long-term financial viability.101 For companies that do not
future-proof their business, ESG-backers believe these companies
run the risk of harming the interests of their shareholders and the
community at large, along with their own long-term stability.102

https://www.northerntrust.com/united-states/insights-research/2021/cis/rise-esg-assetmanagers (“The asset management industry’s embrace of . . . [ESG] investment principles
has played out as a slow burn over the course of the past decade. Now, awareness of the
movement and the will to implement socially responsible investing practices has picked up
for asset managers.”); see also, e.g., Brad Allen, Socially Responsible Investing No Longer a
Fad, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.startribune.com/socially-responsible-investingno-longer-a-fad/458066383/ (“[A]dvisers and asset managers are adopting an ESG screen to
their investment process for four reasons. Differentiating themselves and building deeper
client relationships based on a client’s values is part of the equation. The move also meets
growing demand, particularly among millennials and women, for some ESG overlay to their
investment portfolios.”); Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 28, at 384–85 (“Over the past
decade, trustees have come under increasing pressure to consider . . . [ESG] factors in their
investment decisions, for example, by divesting from fossil fuel, tobacco, or firearms
companies, or otherwise accounting for environmental or social costs in making investment
decisions.”); see also discussion supra Section II.C and accompanying text.
98 Allen, supra note 97. For a discussion of ESG fund performance, see infra notes 121–126.
99 See Derek Horstmeyer, The Surprising Risks of Investing in ESG Funds, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 16, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/risks-of-esg-funds-11631539404 (noting that
ESG investors might take on “more small-cap risk, interest-rate and inflation risk, and singlestock risk than an investor in a standard all-equity fund”).
100 See KPMG, supra note 86, at 23 (“[84%] of respondents agree that maximizing
shareholder returns can no longer be the primary goal of the corporation . . . .”).
101 See id. at 39 (“Markets have been slow to fully price in these risks . . . . Over time,
sustainability will likely have a growing impact on company valuation and cost of capital.”).
102 See id. (“Thus, by not acting to future-proof their businesses now, many listed and
private companies risk harming the interests of their shareholders as well as those of wider
society, not to mention their own long-term financial viability.”).
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C. ESG FUNDS’ INTERNAL POLICIES, EXTERNAL RATINGS, AND
PERFORMANCE

The lack of uniform ESG disclosures for asset managers’ internal
policies and investing strategies and the wide-ranging variety of
ESG ratings103 create barriers to obtaining quality ESG data for
investors to compare ESG funds and evaluate their performance.
These barriers only widen the opportunity for asset managers to
greenwash.104
Depending on their internal policies, asset managers vary in the
way they disclose their internal policies and the way they manage
their ESG funds.105 The SEC recently reported a lack of reasonable
internal policies and procedures—or any policies and procedures at
all—regarding how various asset managers respond to investor
objectives and incorporate ESG factors into their investment
strategies.106 Techniques behind sustainable investing vary across
asset classes and investment strategies from passive to active.107
For passive ESG funds, retail investors rely on asset managers to
follow the fund’s underlying policies as provided for in the fund’s
prospectus.108 These asset managers are largely institutional
See discussion supra note 19.
See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
105 See DONOHUE, supra note 3, at 2 (“[F]unds employ integration and sustainable investing
strategies in various ways. Some funds integrate analysis of ESG factors, others use one or
more sustainable investing strategies, and some integrate ESG factors and use one or more
sustainable investing strategies.”).
106 See SEC, THE DIVISION OF EXAMINATIONS’ REVIEW OF ESG INVESTING, supra note 2, at
3–4 (noting how, after SEC staff examined investment advisers, investment companies, and
private funds, “[t]he staff noted, despite claims to have formal processes in place for ESG
investing, a lack of policies and procedures related to ESG investing; policies and procedures
that did not appear to be reasonably designed to prevent violations of law, or that were not
implemented; documentation of ESG-related investment decisions that was weak or unclear;
and compliance programs that did not appear to be reasonably designed to guard against
inaccurate ESG-related disclosures and marketing materials”).
107 See DONOHUE, supra note 3, at 2 (describing how ESG investing exists along a broad
investing spectrum).
108 See Quinson, supra note 18 (discussing that investors need asset managers to establish
policies in accordance with the fund’s prospectus and philosophy); John C. Coates, The Future
of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 18 (Harv. Pub. L., Working Paper No.
19-07, 2019) (noting the distinction between the interests of passive investors and fund
managers and that “[i]ndex fund managers . . . are coming into their control positions as a
side-effect, largely unintended or even known to their own economic principals (i.e., [retail]
investors)”).
103
104
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investors who pursue ESG funds’ objectives by exerting pressure on
companies for greater ESG disclosures.109 In turn, this increases the
variability of ESG disclosures among companies and asset
managers themselves, both of whom have no standardization, which
makes it harder for investors to compare ESG funds.110
For active asset managing strategies, there is a range of
qualitative and quantitative approaches.111 For example, a
quantitative approach “emphasizes mathematical and statistical
analysis to help determine the value of a financial asset,” while a
qualitative approach is “practiced both as a stand-alone discipline
and in conjunction with traditional qualitative analysis for both
return enhancement and risk mitigation.”112 Another significant
concern potentially contributing to the variability is managers
incorporating ESG factors based on personal policy preferences at
the investor’s expense.113 This variety of passive and active
investing strategies inflates the variability in ESG disclosures as
more asset managers incorporate ESG factors.114

109 See, e.g., Thomas Singer, Environmental and Social Proposals in the 2017 Proxy Season,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
(Oct.
26,
2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/26/environmental-and-social-proposals-in-the2017-proxy-season/ (“Large institutional investors, such as BlackRock and Vanguard, are
beginning to exert pressure on companies by supporting E&S proposals that call for greater
disclosure of issues they deem material to shareholder value.”); Allen, supra note 97 (“[L]arge
asset managers like State Street Global Advisors and BlackRock, who primarily manage
passive funds, are urging companies to focus in their public disclosures on material risks to
their business posed by climate change.”).
110 See, e.g., Curtis et. al., supra note 7, at 408 (“Without consistent data for evaluating the
sustainability of individual portfolio companies, it is difficult to measure the ESG orientation
of a mutual fund or to compare the ‘greenness’ of one fund’s portfolio to that of another.”).
111 See DONOHUE, supra note 3, at 2 (detailing the range of approaches across both asset
classes and strategy styles).
112 James McWhinney, A Simple Overview of Quantitative Analysis, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/041114/simple-overview-quantitativeanalysis.asp (last updated Dec. 1, 2021).
113 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 28, at 436 (“A significant concern is that
managers may invoke ESG factors to enact their own policy preferences at the expense of
shareholders—an agency problem for which there is also some empirical evidence.”).
114 See, e.g., David Ricketts, Fund Managers Face “Urgent Reality Check” on Climate Goals
Amid “Catastrophic” Failure to Meet Paris Goals, FIN. NEWS (Oct. 27, 2021, 12:01 AM),
https://www.fnlondon.com/articles/majority-of-investment-funds-out-of-step-with-climateobjectives-20211027 (“Scrutiny is also increasing on sustainable investment funds, amid fears
among some asset managers that over-playing their ESG credentials could see them accused
of greenwashing.”).
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Along with firms’ varying internal policies and investing
strategies, the elements comprising of ESG funds’ external ratings
by third parties also vary due to a lack of standardization.115 For
example, one empirical study of ESG ratings found that many
indicators are used by only one out of every six raters.116 Another
complicating factor is that an investment firm’s regulatory and
political risks might not be reflected in its ESG rating; for example,
alternative energy sources may receive high ratings despite having
high regulatory risk due to heavy reliance on current government
policy.117 The discernable quality of ESG ratings is further
complicated by the sheer number of raters.118 All major credit
ratings agencies factor ESG criteria into their credit ratings process
and ESG products.119 The increase in ESG investing also attracts
an exponential number of additional ESG raters, further increasing
the variability of ESG ratings and making it difficult for many to
understand how the ratings are calculated.120
The inconsistencies among investment firms’ internal policies,
investing strategies, and their external ESG ratings affects the
analysis of studies attempting to square ESG funds with the firms’

See Curtis et. al., supra note 7, at 397, 420 (“While all four of the ESG ratings that we
use involve a comprehensive assessment, they employ significantly different data and
methodologies.”). For an empirical study on the quality of ESG ratings, see generally id.
116 See Florian Berg, Julian F. Kölbel & Roberto Rigobon, Aggregate Confusion: The
Divergence of ESG Ratings, REV. FIN., May 23, 2022, at 2, 11 (“[A] considerable number of
unclassified indicators shows that there are many aspects of ESG that are only measured by
one out of six raters.”).
117 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 28, at 436 (“Another concern is that the extent
of a firm’s regulatory and political risks may not be reflected in its ESG scoring. For example,
companies pursuing alternative energy sources may score high on ESG factors but still face
significant political and regulatory risk owing to heavy reliance on current government
policy.”).
118 See discussion supra note 19.
119 See KRISTIN L. PARKER & LATRICE M. BAPTISTE, CHAPMAN INSIGHTS, THE ROLE OF ESG
RATINGS PROVIDERS IN ASSESSING ESG PERFORMANCE AND RISKS 2 (May 25, 2021),
https://www.chapman.com/media/publication/1090_Chapman_Insights_ESG_Ratings_Provi
ders_052521.pdf (“[A]ll of the major credit ratings agencies, including Fitch, S&P, and
Moody’s, factored ESG criteria into their credit ratings process long before the development
of their ESG rating products.”).
120 See Kuratek et. al., supra note 56 (“The growing interest in ESG metrics has meant that
the number of ESG raters has grown exponentially, making it difficult for many companies
to understand how each ‘rater’ calculates a company’s ESG score.”); supra note 118 and
accompanying text.
115
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financial performances.121 This market confusion leads to some ESG
investing-objectors attributing added costs to ESG investments.122
For example, the concern that ESG investing leads to added cost
because it decreases portfolio diversification is in part caused by the
lack of uniformity and precision of terms for describing the
investments.123 The wide-ranging difference between passive and
active investment strategies adds to the complication of measuring
performance.124 But a “landmark report”125 from 2005 found that,
because “the links between ESG factors and financial performance
are increasingly being recogni[z]ed,” integrating ESG factors “so as
to more reliably predict financial performance is clearly permissible
and is arguably required in all jurisdictions.”126 Despite this, the
performance and overall metrics of ESG funds will remain difficult
to evaluate without a standardized ESG disclosure framework to
reference.

III. ESG DISCLOSURES IN THE UNITED STATES
Due to the variety of state and federal laws regulating
investment activities in the United States, their brief summary
requires generalization.127 Even with this variety, one common
debate still persists over what ESG disclosures are required under
121 See Jon Hale, Does Sustainable Investing Help or Hurt Returns?, MORNINGSTAR (Dec. 7,
2017),
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/839607/does-sustainable-investing-help-orhurt-returns (finding that ESG investing strategies “outperform the overall universe”).
122 See, e.g., Susan N. Gary, Best Interests in the Long Term: Fiduciary Duties and ESG
Integration, 90 COLO. L. REV. 731, 750 (2019) (noting that the “concern that SRI necessitates
a cost because it imposes a restriction on diversification” is in part caused by the “continuing
confusion about the definition of SRI and the lack of precision with which terms describing
different investment strategies are used”).
123 See id. (noting concerns caused by “continuing confusion about the definition of SRI and
the lack of precision with which terms describing different investment strategies are used”).
124 See Hale, Sustainable Funds, supra note 93 (noting how the “wide variety of investment
approaches” can be “employed within a passive market-cap-weighted strategy or any number
of active strategies, which further complicates performance evaluations”).
125 Townsend, supra note 82, at 6.
126 FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER, UNEP FIN. INITIATIVE, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR
THE INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO
INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTMENT
13
(2005),
https://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/freshfields_legal_resp_20051123.pdf.
127 See id. at 102 (“Given the variety of different federal and state law which regulates the
investment behaviour of these different institutional entities, any summary of the relevant
US law necessarily involves generalisation.”).
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current SEC regulations and laws based on what is material to
investors.128 The discrepancy over what is material is in part due to
the “low-regulation environment” and a lack of consistent and
reliable ESG data for portfolio companies, asset managers, thirdparty ESG raters, and investors to rely on to make informed
decisions.129 For certain ESG investment managers, such as pension
fund trustees, some scholars and practitioners say the trustees’
fiduciary duties now require consideration and disclosure of ESG
factors.130 Others believe that requiring ESG disclosures is
“politicization” and should not be mandated by the SEC.131 They
See Laura E. Deeks, Discourse and Duty: University Endowments, Fiduciary Law, and
the Cultural Politics of Fossil Fuel Divestment, 47 ENVT’L L. 335, 418 (2017) (“[F]iduciary law
arguably requires the consideration of ESG factors when doing so addresses a material risk
to returns.”); David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Corporate Governance Update:
“Materiality” in America and Abroad, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 1, 2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/01/corporate-governance-update-materiality-inamerica-and-abroad/ (“In the current debate over materiality, two issues should remain
distinct: the importance of stakeholder governance and [ESG] on the one hand, and the
question of redefining the standard of materiality from a securities law and market
perspective on the other.”).
129 Reiser & Tucker, supra note 42.
130 See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 28, at 385 (“[A] growing and influential group
of scholars and practitioners, has even taken the position that fiduciary principles require a
trustee to use ESG factors.”); see also Janine Guillot & Jeffrey Hales, Materiality: The Word
That Launched a Thousand Debates, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 14, 2021),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/05/14/materiality-the-word-that-launched-a-thousanddebates/ (“[T]he concept of materiality articulated by the US Supreme Court is well-suited to
the evolving nature of capital markets and the changing information needs of investors.”).
131 Press Release, U.S. S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., Toomey Presses SEC on
New Climate Enforcement Task Force (Mar. 25, 2021) [hereinafter Toomey Presses SEC],
https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/minority/toomey-presses-sec-on-new-climateenforcement-task-force (quoting Pat Toomey’s argument that requiring ESG disclosures is “a
total abuse of power and a politicization of SEC’s disclosure standard”); see also Corder, supra
note 27 (“Unless the SEC plans to force companies to adopt certain models, which there is no
precedent for and the organization ill-equipped to do, they have no business deeming the
current administration’s political priorities as material.”); Alexandra Thornton & Tyler
Gellasch, The SEC Has Broad Authority to Require Climate and Other ESG Disclosures, CTR.
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(June
10,
2021,
9:00
AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2021/06/10/500352/sec-broadauthority-require-climate-esg-disclosures/ (“[S]ome companies, business representatives, and
their political allies have raised questions regarding both the SEC’s authority to require
[ESG] disclosures and the overall wisdom of imposing mandatory disclosures for ESG issues.
Some have gone so far as to disregard securities laws and regulations to argue that the SEC
could or should only require disclosure of information that is financially material to
investors.”).
128
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argue that what is financially material to the reasonable investor
should be of primary importance rather than political opinions
about humanity’s general welfare.132 This materiality concept has
developed in caselaw based on the views of a reasonable investor, is
backed by the Supreme Court,133 and is a necessary element for
actionable greenwashing claims by investors.134
This materiality issue matters today because the SEC previously
rejected the idea that “disclosure of information describing
corporate social practices should be specifically required”—noting
how “certain types of information which are of importance only in
certain instances have generally not been made the subject of
specific disclosure requirements.”135
In essence, the SEC determined that investors were not
interested enough in ESG data to demonstrate it was substantially
likely to be considered significant to a reasonable shareholder.136
Yet, with the rapid growth of investor interest in ESG and the

132 See Toomey Presses SEC, supra note 131 (“[N]ot if it conforms to the woke Left’s opinion
about what’s best for humanity’s general welfare.”).
133 See, e.g., TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (holding that a fact is
material if there is “a substantial likelihood that the . . . . fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available”). Materiality determinations require “delicate assessments of the inferences a
‘reasonable shareholder’ would draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those
inferences to him.” Id. at 450; see also Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Keynote Remarks at the 2021 ESG Disclosure Priorities Event: Living in a Material World:
Myths and Misconceptions About “Materiality” (May 24, 2021) [hereinafter Lee, Keynote
Remarks], https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/lee-living-material-world-052421 (“Although the
SEC must craft the rules, and companies . . . must comply with them, the viewpoint of the
reasonable investor is the lens through which we all are meant to operate. . . . [T]hose with
the money are the ones who decide how to spend it. And there is a clear corollary to that
point—reinforced by Supreme Court precedent—which is that investors are also the ones who
decide what information they need to make those choices.” (footnotes omitted)).
134 See supra Section II.A.2.
135 See Notice of Comm’n Conclusions & Rulemaking Proposals in the Public Proceeding
Announced in Securities Act Release No. 5627, Exchange Act Release No. 11773 (Oct. 14,
1975).
136 See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate
Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1267 (1999) (noting that the SEC determined
“there was not enough investor interest in expanded environmental . . . disclosure to
demonstrate that this information was substantially likely to be significant to a reasonable
shareholder—that is, that it was material”).
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developing rise of investors’ greenwashing claims,137 the SEC has
recently reconsidered mandatory ESG disclosures.138
The SEC began addressing the materiality debate139 and took
various actions in 2021, first by focusing on ESG disclosures.140 In
February 2021, SEC Acting Chair Allison Herren Lee directed the
Division of Corporation Finance to enhance its focus on climate
disclosures.141 On March 4, the SEC created a Climate and ESG
Task Force to develop initiatives to recognize ESG-related
misconduct, initially focusing on identifying “any material gaps or
misstatements in issuers’ disclosure of climate risks under existing
rules.”142 On July 28, SEC Chair Gary Gensler announced the
agency will “develop a mandatory climate risk disclosure rule
proposal” in late 2021,143 though a Proposed Rule was not published

See discussion supra Section II.A.2.
See discussion infra notes 139–148.
139 See Lee, Keynote Remarks, supra note 133 (“As we all debate and deliberate over these
issues, a great deal of attention is focused on the concept of materiality. Materiality is a
fundamental proposition in the securities laws and in our capital markets more broadly.”); cf.
JENNIE MORAWETZ ET AL., KIRKLAND & ELLIS, THE SEC’S RECENT AND PLANNED ACTIVITY ON
CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURES: WHAT COMPANIES CAN DO TO PREPARE (Oct. 1, 2021),
https://www.kirkland.com/-/media/publications/alert/2021/09/the-secs-recent-and-plannedactivity-on-climate-ch.pdf (“According to Commissioner Lee, the concept of materiality
instead arises under the anti-fraud rules, where it functions as a limit on anti-fraud
liability. . . . [O]ther recent disclosure changes that do not hinge on materiality were
congressionally mandated . . . and the concept of materiality could be relevant under Section
23 of the Exchange Act, which requires the SEC to make a cost-benefit analysis during the
rulemaking process to ensure a new rule does not ‘impose a burden on competition not
necessary or appropriate’ to advance the purposes of securities law.”).
140 See Brian Breheny et al., SEC Chair Gensler Outlines Roadmap for Climate Risk
Disclosure Rulemaking, JD SUPRA (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/secchair-gensler-outlines-roadmap-for-7630261/ (“Chair Gensler pointed to strong investor
demand as the main driver behind the SEC’s expected climate risk disclosure rulemaking.”).
141 See Statement, Allison Herren Lee, Comm’r, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on
the Review of Climate-Related Disclosure (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/lee-statement-review-climate-related-disclosure (“Today, I am directing the
Division of Corporation Finance to enhance its focus on climate-related disclosure in public
company filings.”).
142 See Press Release, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Task Force
Focused on Climate and ESG Issues (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2021-42 (noting how the SEC “today announced the creation of a Climate and ESG
Task Force in the Division of Enforcement” with their initial focus on current misconduct of
climate risk disclosure).
143 Gensler, supra note 9.
137
138
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until April 11, 2022,144 and final action is not anticipated by the SEC
until later in 2022.145 This rulemaking process requires public
feedback on the proposed rules, and the subsequent development of
final enforceable rules takes some time.146 It also comes on the heels
of legislation introduced by Congress, namely the Climate Risk
Disclosure Act, which would require the SEC to issue ESG
disclosure rules if it does not do so otherwise.147 On October 21,
2021, SEC Chair Gensler affirmed that “investors want to know
more about climate risk” and that the SEC “has a role to play” in

144 Since this Note’s initial writing, the SEC has released its Proposed Rule mandating
corporate climate disclosures. See The Enhancement and Standardization of Climate-Related
Disclosures for Investors, 87 Fed. Reg. 21,334 (proposed Apr. 11, 2022) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 210, 229, 232, 239, 249) (providing the SEC’s Proposed Rule). However, debate
exists as to whether the Rule would violate the major questions doctrine, with SEC
Commissioner Hester Peirce dissenting to the Rule and twenty-four State Attorneys General
objecting in a comment letter. See Hester M. Peirce, SEC Comm’r, We Are Not the Securities
and
Environment
Commission—At
Least
Not
Yet
(Mar.
21,
2022),
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/peirce-climate-disclosure-20220321 (“We do not have a
clear directive from Congress, and we ought not wade blithely into decisions of such vast
economic and political significance as those touched on by today’s proposal.”); Letter from
Att’ys Gen. of the States of West Virginia, Arizona, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia,
and Wyoming 1 (Jun. 15, 2022), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-10-22/s71022-20131409301574.pdf (noting that the SEC’s Proposed Rule is an “ill-advised misadventure into
environmental regulation”).
145
SEC,
CLIMATE
CHANGE
DISCLOSURE,
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=202204&RIN=3235-AM87 (last
visited Oct. 24, 2022).
146 See JOHN W. WHITE, MATTHEW MORREALE & MICHAEL ARNOLD, CRAVATH, SWAINE &
MOORE LLP, NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE SEC’S CLIMATE CHANGE DISCLOSURE RULEMAKING 4
(Aug. 6, 2021), https://www.cravath.com/a/web/3qjVzkCEz9HbQBfST82db6/34i9Me/cravathnew-insights-into-the-secs-climate-change-disclosure-rulemaking.pdf
(“Even
after
completing the significant amount of work that will lead to a proposal being presented to the
Commission by year-end, there will be a number of steps required for the SEC to collect
feedback, prepare and adopt a final rule and establish an effective date.”).
147 See Brett Thorpe, The SEC’s Rulemaking Agenda: ESG, JD SUPRA (June 29, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-sec-s-rulemaking-agenda-esg-4873903/ (“Congress
has also been stirred to action having introduced the Climate Risk Disclosure Act, which
would require the SEC to issue rules requiring an array of climate disclosures, including
emissions, fossil fuel-related assets, impact of climate change on company valuation, and risk
management strategies related to climate change.”).
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facilitating any climate disclosure requirements.148 At the same
time, concerns within the SEC over the considerations regarding
ESG disclosures persist and include those of SEC Commissioner
Hester Peirce, who suggested that the SEC has not taken a position
on ESG disclosure yet partly because “defining ESG factors is value
laden and would involve confronting contentious political issues.”149
In addition to recent SEC actions, the Department of Labor
(DOL) began addressing ESG investing in the context of retirement
funds by requiring fund managers to only consider “pecuniary
factors.”150 After the changeover from the Trump to the Biden
administration, however, the DOL announced it does not plan to
enforce the Trump-era rule.151 More recently, the DOL’s Employee
Benefits Security Administration (ESBA) proposed a rule that
explains fund managers’ consideration of ESG factors under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, which
closed its comment period on December 13, 2021.152
The inherent nature of fiduciary duties may complicate the
ability to measure and regulate disclosures of ESG risk.153 Due to
the high standard of fiduciary duties, certain asset managers, like
active pension fund trustees, must typically aim to maximize
Gary Gensler, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement Before the Financial
Stability Oversight Council (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/gensler-statement-financial-stability-oversight-council-102121.
149 Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 28, at 436 (citing Hester M. Peirce, SEC
Commissioner Airs Her Beef with Stakeholders, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/09/26/sec-commissioner-airs-her-beef-withstakeholders/).
150 See Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, supra note 19 (“[A] fiduciary’s
evaluation of an investment [or investment course of action must] be focused only on
pecuniary factors.”); see also Reiser & Tucker, supra note 42, at 1926 (describing how the
DOL can act as a “shadow securities regulator through its oversight of ERISA-governed
plans”).
151 See Stephen M. Humenik & Michael G. Lee, Environmental Considerations in Financial
Regulation,
A.B.A.:
BUS.
L.
TODAY
(Oct.
21,
2021),
https://businesslawtoday.org/2021/10/environmental-considerations-in-financial-regulation/
(“The EBSA under President Biden had already announced, in March 2021, that it would not
enforce the ESG Rules.”).
152 See id. (“On [October 14,] 2021, the EBSA published a proposed rule . . . that clarifies
the consideration of ESG factors by fiduciaries under [ERISA] of 1974. The comment period
for the ESG Proposed Rule closes on [December 13,] 2021.”).
153 See Kolakowski, supra note 96 (“Early adopters of sustainable investing find that,
because of excessive short-term focus, the markets have been slow to price in risks related to
sustainability.”).
148
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returns of the fund.154 Implementing a short-term aim to maximize
funds can lead to greater capitalization of the primary drivers of the
climate crisis,155 running directly against eco-conscious investors’
aims. The overarching goal of maximizing short-term returns
conflicts with the long-term considerations that ESG investing
requires.156 Because of this short-term focus, markets are slower to
price in long-term risks, which may not be reflected in stock prices
until further down the road.157 As current concerns grow, regulators
should implement a uniform ESG disclosure framework to address
the United States’ unique lack of mandatory standardized reporting
to allow asset managers to incorporate and disclose ESG factors
more consistently and better inform investors. Looking at other
nations’ frameworks can help guide this process.

IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ESG DISCLOSURE
FRAMEWORKS
Several entities have tried to create a global framework for
sustainability reporting. Most notably, the International Financial
Reporting Standards Foundation recently introduced a new global
standard-setting
board—the
International
Sustainability
Standards Board (ISSB).158 The ISSB is tasked with developing a
154 See Jason Fernandes & Janelle Orsi, Commentary, Rethinking Retirement Savings, 134
HARV. L. REV. F. 348, 350 (2021) (“The prevailing judicial approach to this problem is to
require trustees to maximize returns of the fund, collapsing the various interests of plan
beneficiaries into a single monetary goal.”).
155 See id. at 348 (“ERISA’s strict fiduciary rules have funneled assets into the industries
that have been the primary drivers of the climate crisis and rising inequality, ultimately
harming the people the statute is meant to protect.”).
156 See Practical Guide to Corporate Governance and Accounting ¶ 1632, supra note 23
(“Looking at risk from an ESG point of view means looking toward the horizon for risks that
threaten the long-term profits and value of an enterprise. The concern is not earnings per
share for the next quarter, next year, or even next five years. It looks toward generational
risks that threaten the careers of young people just joining the enterprise, the retirement
benefits of those leaving the enterprise . . . and long-term investors.”).
157 See Kolakowski, supra note 96 (explaining that a short-term focus slows pricing in of
sustainability-based risks).
158 See IFRS Foundation Announces International Sustainability Standards Board,
Consolidation with CDSB and VRF, and Publication of Prototype Disclosure Requirements,
IFRS (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.ifrs.org/news-and-events/news/2021/11/ifrs-foundationannounces-issb-consolidation-with-cdsb-vrf-publication-of-prototypes/
(announcing
the
creation of ISSB to “develop—in the public interest—a comprehensive global baseline of highquality sustainability disclosure standards to meet investors’ information needs”).
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global standard of ESG disclosure requirements.159 Although the
ISSB proposed a set of draft requirements in March 2022,160 its
impact on investors will not occur until national and regional
regulators adopt the standards, which could take years.161 To speed
up this process, ISSB offices will be placed around the world
including Germany, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States,
with discussions about adding offices in China and Japan.162
Other global standards currently in place include those from the
CFA Institute, a non-profit of investing professionals that developed
its Global ESG Disclosure Standards for Investment Products to
eliminate the non-standardization of global reporting and to
encourage mutually reinforcing solutions for all investment
types.163 Additionally, two of the most used sustainability reporting
standards are the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board
(SASB) Standard164 and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)

See id. (“[T]hese developments create the necessary institutional arrangements . . . and
lay the technical groundwork for a global sustainability disclosure standard-setter for the
financial markets.”).
160 See
IFRS, [DRAFT] IFRS S1 GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR DISCLOSURE OF
SUSTAINABILITY-RELATED
FINANCIAL
INFORMATION
22–39
(Mar.
2022),
https://www.ifrs.org/content/dam/ifrs/project/general-sustainability-relateddisclosures/exposure-draft-ifrs-s1-general-requirements-for-disclosure-of-sustainabilityrelated-financial-information.pdf.
(providing
proposed
guidelines
for
disclosing
sustainability-related financial information).
161 See Brendan Bailey & Edward Ivey, New Sustainability Standards Board to Develop
Global
Sustainability
Disclosure
Standards,
JD SUPRA
(Dec.
10,
2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/sustainability-standards-board-to-2294194/ (discussing
ISSB’s formation and noting that “widespread adoption and impact of any new standards will
take years”).
162 Id.
163 See CFA INST., GLOBAL ESG DISCLOSURE STANDARDS FOR INVESTMENT PRODUCTS, at v
(2021)
https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/ESG-standards/Global-ESGDisclosure-Standards-for-Investment-Products.pdf
(“The
problems
of
overlapping
investment product categorization, non-standardized terminology, and greenwashing are
unlikely to be fully addressed by a single solution. Multiple, mutually reinforcing solutions
are required if these problems are to be addressed in all markets around the world and for all
types of investment products.”).
164 See SASB, ASSET MANAGEMENT & CUSTODY ACTIVITIES: SUSTAINABILITY ACCOUNTING
STANDARD
4
(Dec.
2021),
https://www.sasb.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/Asset_Management_Custody_Activities_Standard_2021.pdf
(“SASB Standards are designed to enable communications on corporate performance on
industry-level sustainability issues in a cost-effective and decision-useful manner.”).
159
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Standard.165—although even they have fundamentally different
definitions of materiality.166
In addition to global standardization efforts, national and
regional regulations and guidance are starting to take shape.
Countries with regulations or guidance already in place include
China, the European Union (EU), Japan, Malaysia, and
Mongolia.167 Those in their drafting stages include Russia, South
Africa, and South Korea.168 Those with regulations or guidance
under development include Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, Colombia,
the Dominican Republic, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, the United Kingdom
(UK), and Vietnam.169 Those in discussions include Mexico and Sri
Lanka.170
The EU is the major foreign market mandating ESG disclosure.
In 2020, the EU established regulations to develop a framework “to
facilitate sustainable investment,”171 and in 2021, it adopted its
Sustainable Finance Package.172 As part of its overarching climate
change action plan, the EU is currently developing its EU Green
Taxonomy, though its implementation is still in the works.173 A
165
See The Global Standards for Sustainability Reporting, GRI (2021),
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/ (“The GRI Standards enable any organization . . .
to understand and report on their impacts on the economy, environment and people in a
comparable and credible way . . . .”).
166 See Guillot & Hales, supra note 130 (“[T]wo of the most widely used sustainability
standards—those of SASB and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)—have historically used
fundamentally different definitions of materiality. This has led to a market dialogue in which
even informed participants must take pains to avoid talking past each other.”).
167 See Taxomania! An International Overview, FUTURE SUSTAINABLE DATA ALL. (Sept.
2021), https://futureofsustainabledata.com/taxomania-an-international-overview/ (“The idea
of regulatory guidance on what constitutes a green investment has now developed into a
veritable ‘Taxomania’, with numerous taxonomies in development around the world . . . .”).
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Parliament and Council Regulation 2020/852, 2020 O.J (L 198) 13.
172
See Sustainable Finance Package, EUR. COMM’N (Apr. 21, 2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/210421-sustainable-finance-communication_en
(adopting the package as a means to “help improve the flow of money towards sustainable
activities across the European Union”).
173
See EU Taxonomy for Sustainable Activities, EUR. COMM’N (2021),
https://finance.ec.europa.eu/sustainable-finance/tools-and-standards/eu-taxonomysustainable-activities_en (discussing the need for and the substance of the EU Taxonomy
system).
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recent update occurred on January 12, 2022, when parties could no
longer comment on the proposed classification of certain green
activities—which included nuclear and gas businesses.174
Specifically for investment managers, the EU’s Sustainable Finance
Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) introduced mandatory and optional
ESG indicators to guide the financial market currently subject to
mandatory sustainability disclosures.175
Despite collective disclosure efforts, one challenge EU countries
face is the lack of universal regulations.176 The UK set out new
requirements for asset managers in its Sustainability Disclosure
Requirements, requiring all investment products to provide their
financial activities’ environmental impact and substantiate all
sustainability claims made of an investment product.177 In addition,
Germany and France’s financial regulators, BaFin and AMF,
respectively, impose certain sustainability requirements on ESG
investors.178 This supervisory variance creates a “direct risk to
investors” as asset managers attempt to manage moving goalposts
amongst nations.179
In October 2021, the UK published Greening Finance, a roadmap
with a three-part plan for creating a uniform regime for required
See The EU’s Green-Investing “Taxonomy” Could Go Global, ECONOMIST (Jan. 8, 2022),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/01/08/the-eus-green-investingtaxonomy-could-go-global (“[T]he European Commission proposed classing some nuclear and
gas projects as green in its ‘taxonomy’, a list meant to define sustainable investing. Austria
threatened to sue; Germany cried foul. The plan is still likely to win majority support from
member states, which have until January 12th to opine.”).
175 See NATIXIS, SUSTAINABLE FINANCE DISCLOSURE REGULATION: ENHANCING CLARITY ON
SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT PRODUCTS (2021), https://gsh.cib.natixis.com/api-websitefeature/files/download/11802/Appendix_-SFDR.pdf (listing the mandatory and optional
environmental and social indicators).
176 See Andrew, European Regulators, supra note 42 (“Regulatory divergence across Europe
on [ESG] investing is a direct risk to investors as asset managers struggle to get to grips with
a rapidly changing landscape and moving goalposts.”).
177 See Theo Andrew, Chancellor Sunak Sets Out Sustainability Requirements for Asset
Managers
Ahead
of
COP
26,
ETF
STREAM
(Oct.
18,
2021),
https://www.etfstream.com/news/chancellor-sunak-sets-out-sustainability-requirements-forasset-managers-ahead-of-cop-26/ (“For the first time, [SDR] will require every investment
product to set out the environmental impact of the activities in finances and justify any
sustainability claims it makes.”).
178 See Andrew, European Regulators, supra note 42 (describing how the UK’s SDR comes
as “the German and French financial regulators, BaFin and AMF, also impose their
conditions on ESG investors”).
179 Id.
174
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ESG disclosures to help “build trust and combat potential
‘greenwashing.’”180 Like the EU’s SFDR indicators, the roadmap
aims to integrate ESG risk information fully across the economy
into “every investment decision and the strategy of every
business.”181 The roadmap includes plans for mandatory corporate
climate disclosures, reporting requirements for asset managers on
how they account for sustainability, and the development of a Green
Taxonomy.182
The UK Green Taxonomy is overseen by the Green Technical
Advisory Group (GTAG), an independent body established in June
2021 to provide the government with impartial, non-binding
advice.183 The Taxonomy, like the EU’s, has six total environmental
objectives that are identical to the EU Taxonomy’s objectives: (1)
Climate change mitigation; (2) Climate change adaptation; (3)
Sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources; (4)
Transition to a circular economy; (5) Pollution prevention and
control; and (6) Protection and restoration of biodiversity and
ecosystems.184 The Taxonomy will provide technical screening
criteria for objectives one and two before the government tables
legislation later in 2022.185
In substance, the Taxonomy is like a dictionary in that it defines
what is sustainable and what is not, contains reference terms, and

GREENING FINANCE, supra note 16, at 3, 5.
Id. at 2.
182 See id. at 3 ([T]his [r]oadmap . . . sets out plans for sustainability-related disclosures
that will take forward the government’s commitment to a sustainable financial system.”).
183 See David Berman et al., UK Government Releases Roadmap to Sustainable Investing,
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.globalelr.com/2021/10/uk-governmentreleases-roadmap-to-sustainable-investing/#_edn2 (“The Green Technical Advisory Group,
an independent body established in June 2021, will develop a set of technical screening
criteria (TSC) that will underline each of the six environmental objectives.”); New
Independent Group to Help Tackle “Greenwashing,” GOV.UK (June 9, 2021),
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-independent-group-to-help-tackle-greenwashing
(“[GTAG] will provide independent, non-binding advice to the Government on developing and
implementing a green taxonomy in the UK context.”).
184 See Berman et al., supra note 183.
185 See id. (“TSC for objectives 1 and 2 will be subject to consultation in Q1 2022, ahead of
the government’s plan to table legislation later in 2022 . . . .”); supra note 173 (noting that on
December 9, 2021, a first delegated act was published specifying how the first two objectives
are applicable since January 2022, while a second act for the remaining objectives will be
published in 2022).
180
181
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lists members established by the GTAG.186 The GTAG aims to
develop the Green Taxonomy to help firms adapt through
implementation by various sectors of the market.187 The Green
Taxonomy introduces reporting requirements and advances its
sustainable labeling system for investment products, which is to be
reviewed every three years.188
Other countries have implemented their own frameworks. For
example, in 2021, China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment
proposed company disclosure requirements with the rules’ monthlong consultation period closing on October 24, 2021.189 Its first
attempt at a mandatory ESG reporting regime imposes low
penalties of around $15,536 and aims to establish a nationwide
system of environmental disclosures by 2025.190 The new scheme
could help close the gap between China’s reporting and that of other
major markets requiring some level of ESG reporting, although
China’s alignment with global reporting standards is unclear.191
With the vast variation in ESG standards among nations, global
development is needed.

186 See Jennifer Laidlaw, New EU ESG Disclosure Rules to Recast Sustainable Investment
Landscape, S&P GLOB. (Aug. 3, 2021), https://www.spglobal.com/esg/insights/new-eu-esgdisclosure-rules-to-recast-sustainable-investment-landscape (“The taxonomy is simply a
dictionary, which defines what is sustainable and what is not.”).
187 See GREENING FINANCE, supra note 16, at 38–39 (summarizing the regulatory approach
to each type of entity and product).
188 See id. at 20–28 (summarizing how standards will help define what is green); see also
Berman et al., supra note 183 (“Creators of investment products will face new requirements
to report on sustainability impacts, risks, and opportunities, which will form the basis of a
sustainability labelling regime.”).
189 See Jingwei Jia, Proposed Rules May Strengthen China’s ESG Disclosure, FITCH
RATINGS (Oct. 28, 2021, 5:41 AM), https://www.fitchratings.com/research/corporatefinance/proposed-rules-may-strengthen-chinas-esg-disclosure-28-10-2021
(“Mandatory
environmental information disclosure requirements for companies proposed by the [MEE]
could improve investor access to data and risk assessment around [ESG] factors in China”
and the “MEE’s month-long consultation around the new requirements closed on 24 October
2021.”).
190 Id.
191 See id. (“The new MEE rules, as put forward, could help close the reporting gap between
China and international practice as most major markets require a degree of mandatory
reporting on ESG factors. Nonetheless, the extent to which the scheme would be aligned with
international reporting standards remains unclear.”).
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V. REMEDYING ESG INVESTMENT GREENWASHING
A standard ESG framework for asset managers to use will help
create consistent and reliable data, better inform investors, and
deter greenwashing. An ESG framework will help asset managers
draft informative disclosures of their ESG funds and avoid
greenwashing litigation. While existing legal avenues are available
for greenwashing claims against asset managers, these actions have
largely been dismissed or settled.192 Investors would benefit from
asset managers’ use of an ESG framework to better assess
investments, evaluate potential greenwashing claims, and deter
asset managers from making misleading statements when drafting
disclosures that investors rely on. This initiative comports with the
SEC’s Asset Management Advisory Committee’s (AMAC)193
recommendation that the SEC should “take steps to foster
meaningful, consistent, and comparable disclosure of material
[ESG] matters.”194
The ESG framework for asset managers should be one part of an
overarching reference guide to provide consistent ESG terminology
throughout portfolio companies, investment firms, and third-party
raters. Like the EU Taxonomy, the overarching guide’s goal should
be to inform market decisionmakers and investors of activities that
significantly impact environmental objectives and help finance the
sustainability goals of the United States.195 To best implement this
guide, the existing voluntary framework preparers should update
their products to correspond with the new guide to eliminate the
many conflicting frameworks currently using fundamentally
different definitions.196 A helpful tool to ensure uniform reporting
See supra Section II.A.2.
The AMAC subcommittee was created “generally to review matters concerning [ESG]
issues and make recommendations to AMAC regarding how these matters might pertain to
managed investment products.” SEC, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ESG, supra note 10, at 1.
194 Id.
195 See EU Taxonomy for Sustainable Activities, supra note 173 (“The EU taxonomy would
provide companies, investors and policymakers with appropriate definitions for which
economic activities can be considered environmentally sustainable. In this way, it should
create security for investors, protect private investors from greenwashing, help companies to
become more climate-friendly, mitigate market fragmentation and help shift investments
where they are most needed.”).
196 See, e.g., Towards Consistent and Comparable ESG Reporting, KPMG (2020),
https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2020/05/towards-consistent-and-comparable-esg192
193
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should be used, such as one similar to GRI’s Report Registration
System, which allows reports referencing GRI’s standards to be
uploaded for processing registration.197 In addition, reliability can
only be achieved if specific types of data points are required so
companies cannot selectively choose what to disclose.198
The overarching guide and specific ESG framework for asset
managers should be developed by building off existing frameworks.
This includes, for example, the SEC’s A Plain English Handbook;199
global frameworks, such as the CFA Institute’s Global ESG
Disclosure Standards for Investment Products;200 and other national
taxonomies, such as the EU and UK’s green taxonomies.201 Similar
to the CFA’s globalization goal to support mutually reinforcing
solutions, the overarching guide should be largely consistent with
an enforceable global standardization once developed, such as the
ISSB framework. This will encourage an all-encompassing
resolution for investors and ensure that global asset managers do
not face varied regulations.202 This will also help defeat the barrier
to quality ESG data created by the inability to compare ESG metrics

reporting.html (“A significant number of frameworks and voluntary standards already exist
for ESG reporting, even running into the hundreds. But in fact, this is part of the problem.
There are so many that for some preparers it can be hard to know which one to follow . . . . But
this multiplicity means that it can be challenging to take an objective view because the
different frameworks are often not directly comparable.”).
197
Register Your Report, GRI, https://www.globalreporting.org/how-to-use-the-gristandards/register-your-report/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2022).
198 See Larry D. Thompson, The Responsible Corporation: Its Historical Roots and
Continuing Promise, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 199, 223 (2015) (noting how
“credible, comparable, and consistent” information cannot be achieved “if companies can
effectively rate themselves and disclose only the information that they wish”).
199 See SEC, A PLAIN ENGLISH HANDBOOK: HOW TO CREATE CLEAR SEC DISCLOSURE
DOCUMENTS (1998) https://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf (providing guidance for how
companies should draft their disclosures).
200 See CFA INST., GLOBAL ESG DISCLOSURE STANDARDS FOR INVESTMENT PRODUCTS,
supra note 163 (“The Global ESG Disclosure Standards for Investment Products . . . are
ethical standards based on the principles of fair representation and full disclosure.”).
201 Europe is a leading region for ESG disclosures. See TCFD TASK FORCE, supra note 15,
at 8 (“Europe remains the leading region for disclosures, with average level of reporting across
the 11 recommended disclosures from fiscal year 2020 now at half of European companies
assessed.”).
202 See Marc S. Gerbe & Simon Toms, ESG: Many Demands, Few Clear Rules, SKADDEN
(Feb. 3, 2021), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2021/02/the-informedboard/esg-many-demands-few-clear-rules (“With no uniform set of ESG standards, companies
with global operations may face a hodgepodge of disclosure requirements.”).
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across industries and countries.203 It also aligns with the AMAC’s
recommendation for the SEC to study third-party frameworks and
acquire subject matter expertise on how frameworks can provide
authoritative guidance.204
The core of the ESG framework for asset managers should be a
classification system that determines the sustainability of different
economic activities for asset managers to report against.205 The
framework should be used by asset managers to reference when
integrating ESG investing policies and strategies, labeling their
ESG products, and making disclosures of those products to
investors. The new framework should be tailored to various specific
types of asset managers, ranging from passive to active, to best suit
each specific asset manager’s needs.206 This allows managers to
support objective statements with concrete sustainability efforts
using reliable data and sufficiently relays their internal ESG
policies to investors, which will better protect themselves against
increasing greenwashing litigation.207 To encourage asset
managers’ use of the ESG framework, current disclosure rules
sufficiently require investment products labeled as ESG funds or
SRI products provide material information on ESG risks without

203 See, e.g., Alexis See Tho, SASB Issues XBRL Taxonomy to Improve ESG Reporting
Comparability,
FIN.
MGMT.
(Oct.
14,
2021),
https://www.fmmagazine.com/news/2021/oct/sasb-xbrl-taxonomy-esg-reporting-comparability.html
(“The
lack of comparability of ESG metrics across industries and countries is an oft-cited barrier to
quality ESG data that’s useful for decision-making.”).
204 See SEC, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ESG, supra note 10, at 8 (recommending that the SEC
should “accelerate its study of third-party ESG disclosure frameworks for the disclosure of
material ESG matters and acquire relevant subject matter expertise to assess how
frameworks could play a more authoritative role in a near future”).
205 See, e.g., Elizabeth Meager, Who Cares If the UK and EU’s Green Taxonomies Diverge?,
CAP. MONITOR (Apr. 12, 2021), https://capitalmonitor.ai/institution/government/who-cares-ifthe-uk-and-eus-green-taxonomies-diverge/ (“[A] green taxonomy is a classification system
that determines the sustainability of different economic activities, which companies then
report against.”).
206 See Reporting Framework Pilot: Next Steps for Signatories, PRI (Aug. 2, 2021),
https://www.unpri.org/reporting-and-assessment/reporting-framework-pilot-next-steps-forsignatories/8159.article (noting how the feedback it received regarding its model framework
“varied between modules and between asset owners and investment managers, with some
areas flagged as requiring attention or being less suited to specific signatory types”).
207 See Baay et. al., supra note 52 (“If a company can support concrete statements with
concrete sustainability efforts and firm data, the better able they are to neutralize and defend
the greenwashing claims that are now flooding the US litigation landscape.”).
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mandating specific approaches.208 New regulations mandating
reliance on the ESG framework, however, should ensure that asset
managers claiming their investments are sustainable actually rely
on the ESG framework’s guidance when making these claims.209
Investor skepticism can also be mitigated through investor
reference to the ESG framework.210 The SEC’s Core Disclosure
Principles aim to help investors “find what they need, understand
what they find, and use what they find to make informed
investment decisions.”211 To help investors find what they need, the
framework should use plain language like that suggested by the
SEC’s A Plain English Handbook but with all the necessary ESG
information. To help investors understand this data and make
informed decisions, the framework’s classification system should
provide specific terms and parameters accurately representing the
relationship between the investment strategies and ESG values
considered by asset managers.212 This will help reduce subjective
disclosures of asset managers’ internal policies and strategies and
help mitigate industry inconsistency among ESG disclosures,
allowing investors to be adequately informed.213 Informed investors
208 See, e.g., SEC, FORM N-1A, ITEM 4(B) https://www.sec.gov/files/formn-1a.pdf (last visited
Jan. 14, 2022) (indicating funds should “summarize the principal risks of investing in the
Fund, including the risks to which the Fund’s portfolio as a whole is subject and the
circumstances reasonably likely to affect adversely the Fund’s net asset value, yield, and total
return”); see also SEC, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ESG, supra note 10, at 9 (“Existing rules for
investment product disclosure and advertising are sufficient and adequate . . . .”).
209 See SEC, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ESG, supra note 10, at 7, 9 (noting how the SEC
should “provide best practice guidance rather than mandate specific approaches” and that
“disclosures would be improved by elements of comparability”); see also supra note 29.
210 See Hoch & Franz, supra note 17, at 442–43 (“Consumer skepticism stems in large part
from false environmental advertising, but it is also attributable to the lack of uniformity in
defining environmental terms such as ‘biodegradable,’ ‘recyclable,’ and ‘ozone-friendly.’ This
lack of uniformity makes it difficult to know when a consumer product is indeed ecologically
sound.”).
211 Fund Disclosure at a Glance, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/investment/fund-disclosure-ata-glance (last visited Jan. 13, 2022).
212 See, e.g., Dean Ritz, The Transformative Power of Taxonomies, WORKIVA (Nov. 18, 2020),
https://www.workiva.com/blog/transformative-power-taxonomies (“The big deal of all this is
to represent the relationships you know exist between values, and document these
relationship[s] . . . . It is a description of how your numbers work without the gridlock of a
spreadsheet.”).
213 See The EU’s Green-Investing “Taxonomy” Could Go Global, supra note 174 (“[T]he lack
of a shared benchmark means scorecards remain subjective and inconsistent across the
industry, which confuses investors. Having a dictionary where they can look up whether an
investment can be labelled green puts everyone on the same page.”).
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can then invest based on sound ESG data and better assess the
merits of potential greenwashing claims.214
Like the EU and the UK taxonomies, the United States also
should address the information gap created by portfolio companies’
voluntary disclosures through the creation of a framework
specifically suited for portfolio companies of ESG funds. This would
accompany frameworks generally suited for all types of public
companies registered with the SEC that disclose ESG information.
The portfolio company framework should be part of the overarching
guide, but one geared for use by companies who decide to disclose
ESG merits to ensure the flow of accurate data.215 This will
eliminate the clout from companies increasingly publicizing
substantial information about their ESG risks and efforts216 and the
inconsistency frustrating ESG investment producers.217 This is
consistent with the AMAC’s recommendation to adopt standards
that guide portfolio companies under current regulations.218 To
ensure the appropriate degree of clarity that investment firms need,
the portfolio companies’ framework should be implemented first. 219
This would prevent the challenge that the EU is currently facing
from its investment firms having to comply with the Green

214 See, e.g., Cherry, supra note 74, at 301 (“Given that signals in the market for CSR are
noisy, consumers and investors may make assessment mistakes.”).
215 See GREENING FINANCE, supra note 16, at 7 (describing how phase one of the roadmap
“address[es] the information gap for market participants, ensuring a flow of decision-useful
information on environmental sustainability from corporates to financial market
participants”).
216 See SOC’Y FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE & GIBSON DUNN, supra note 60, at 3 (“Companies are
also increasingly disseminating significant amounts of information about [their ESG] efforts
and future commitments.”).
217 See, e.g., Hoch & Franz, supra note 17, at 443 (noting frustration of producers from
inconsistent environmental terminology).
218 See SEC, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ESG, supra note 10 (“[R]equirements are already in
place requiring issuers to disclose material risks, and the AMAC does not recommend changes
to the regulatory framework.”).
219 See Fisch, supra note 27, at 930 (stating how uniform disclosures “would be an important
first step toward improving the uniformity, reliability, and comparability of sustainability
disclosure and would provide important data to allow the capital markets to evaluate the
impact of sustainable business practices”). But cf. Kuratek et al., supra note 56 (“By
understanding the current ESG market raters and methodologies, companies will be able to
better align their ESG disclosures with them.”).
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Taxonomy before the portfolio companies are required to disclose
the underlying ESG information.220
Another challenge the overarching guide should address is the
non-standardization of ESG ratings issued by third parties.221 By
creating one overarching guide containing specific frameworks for
asset managers, portfolio companies, and third-party raters,
investors can be better informed, and greenwashing can be
mitigated.

VI. CONCLUSION
Without any current mandate in the United States regarding
ESG disclosures, investment firms promoting ESG investments
lack the necessary reliable data to assess portfolio companies’ ESG
risks objectively and to disclose their ESG strategies accurately to
investors. In addition, portfolio companies and third-party raters of
ESG funds further add to the confusion of the ESG lexicon. This
inconsistency increases the likelihood of potential greenwashing.
Investors misled by ESG funds’ greenwashing have remedial
avenues under existing consumer protection and securities fraud
laws. The novel cases against ESG asset managers, however, are
backed by thin caselaw—and most greenwashing cases against
portfolio companies have been dismissed. Thus, plaintiffs alleging
greenwashing of their ESG funds can benefit from a standard ESG
framework to help evaluate potential claims. This is especially
crucial as exponential ESG information continues to circulate.
Creating an ESG framework is especially important considering
the SEC’s current rulemaking initiative to mandate ESG
disclosures. An effective ESG fund framework should be developed
along with those for other specific ESG investments. These
frameworks should be part of an overarching guide with additional
frameworks for portfolio companies and third-party ESG raters.
Even if ESG disclosures for all parties are not mandated, developing
a mandatory overarching guide for those wishing to disclose ESG
See The EU’s Green-Investing “Taxonomy” Could Go Global, supra note 174 (“[B]ecause
of missed deadlines, green-finance firms are being asked to report on their compliance with
the taxonomy before companies are required to provide the underlying data, making the job
difficult.”).
221 See Kuratek et al., supra note 56 (“The growing interest in ESG metrics has meant that
the number of ESG raters has grown exponentially, making it difficult for many companies
to understand how each ‘rater’ calculates a company’s ESG score.”).
220
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information is necessary for creating consistent, reliable data. The
guide should be developed after studying existing frameworks and
considering global standards to account for the increasing demand
for ESG investing, the disclosure of ESG data, and the rise of global
ESG investments.
Asset managers of ESG funds can benefit from using an ESG
framework to determine how they evaluate and incorporate ESG
merits into investments they claim as sustainable. Asset managers
can then accurately and consistently label, promote, and disclose
information about their ESG products. This will ensure consistency
among ESG disclosures, allow investors to inform themselves by
relying on accurate data, and mitigate greenwashing.
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